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Introduction: On Thinking within a Tradition  
 
“We are expected to develop our own opinions, outlook, stances on things, to a considerable degree 
through solitary reflection. But this is not how things work with important issues, such as the definition of 
our identity. We define this always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the identities our 
significant others want to recognize in us. And even when we outgrow some of the latter—our parents, for 
instance—and they disappear from our lives, the conversation with them continues within us as long as we 
live.” 
                   –Charles Taylor: Ethics of Authenticity  
 
The original impetus for writing this thesis came from a series of conversations I 
had with Professor Robert E. Proctor while studying abroad in Rome, Italy. I had recently 
rediscovered Proctor’s work on Defining the Humanities and was quite struck by its 
apparent skepticism regarding the didactic value of the “modern” self. One passage stood 
out in particular:  
I want to argue that this shaping [of the self] cannot be accomplished without models to 
emulate, and that the Greeks and the Romans are the only such models capable of such 
emulation…the personal self, in all its glorious autonomy—which is also a form of 
isolation from both the cosmos and society—is too little, too weak, too “self-centered”—
too imperfect in short, to inspire another human being to self-perfection. We can learn a 
great deal about our selves and our experience of the human by reading and re-reading 
Hamlet. But if our goal is Bruni’s or Arnold’s “perfecting” of a self, there is nothing in 
Hamlet to emulate.1  
Implicit within this critique, or so I thought at the time, was not only a skepticism over 
the possibility of establishing a purely “modern humanities” but more importantly, an 
epistemic claim related to how we moderns may come to know and shape our selves.  
 The notion of “making a life,” of shaping one’s self (Bildung) towards a particular 
goal has all but vanished in the modern world. Covetous of maintaining a multiplicity of 
                                                 
1 Robert E. Proctor. Defining the Humanities. Second Edition. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998, 
pp. 109-110.  
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choices in our lives and wary of our unconscious energies and desires, we moderns seek 
autonomy, freedom and, above all, harmony in our life decisions. To constrain ourselves 
to a particular end or goal (telos) would not only set limits to our desire for boundless 
agency, it would run against, what Lionel Trilling refers to as, our “cultural grain—it is as 
if the fluidity of the contemporary world demands an analogous limitlessness in our 
personal perspective.”2 Modern debates on selfhood and its cultivation have thus shifted 
away from the concept of Bildung—a shaping of the self—and toward the subjective and 
more limitless act of self-analysis. This turn to the self, or “slide to subjectivism,” as 
Charles Taylor terms it in his Ethics of Authenticity, is a dominant social fact of our lives 
and has colored most, if not all, of the modern debates on selfhood and agency.3 
The implications of this recent turn in western thought are manifold and not a few 
scholars have chosen to address the more deviant forms of our individualist ethos.4 In 
Taylor’s view, our modern centering on the self, heightened subjectivism and abiding 
pursuit of instrumental reason5 is not in itself disastrous, but merely a degenerate form of 
a lively modern ethic which can no longer look to the “publicly accessible order of 
                                                 
2 Lionel Trilling. “The Uncertain Future of the Humanistic Educational Ideal.” In The Last Decade: Essays 
and Reviews, 1965-75. Ed. Diana Trilling. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 175. Quoted in: Ibid. 
p. 112. 
3 A sense of individualism, both in its political manifestations and in its emphasis on self-responsibility and 
personal commitment, has permeated western thought for some time; arguably one could trace it back to 
the thought of Descartes and Locke, even Plato. What makes the individualism of our age novel, and thus 
particular to our culture, is its subjective and egoistic connotations. “The dark side of individualism,” 
Taylor observes, “is a centering on the self, which both flattens and narrows our lives, makes them poorer 
in meaning, and less concerned with others or society” (Charles Taylor. Ethnics of Authenticity, p. 4).  
4 To mention only a few: Albert Borgman (Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life); Peter 
Berger et. al. (The Homeless Mind); Robert E. Proctor (Defining the Humanities); Charles Taylor (Sources 
of the Self, Ethics of Authenticity and the “Diversity of Goods”); Lionel Trilling (Sincerity and 
Authenticity); Allan Bloom (The Closing of the American Mind); Will Kymlicka (Liberalism, Community 
and Culture); David Harvey (The Condition of Postmodernity); Rollo May (Psychology and the Human 
Dilemma, Love and Will and Man’s Search for Himself ); George Herbert Mead (Mind, Self and Society); 
R. Bellah et. al. (Habits of the Heart).    
5 See: Charles Taylor. The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 5-6: “By 
‘instrumental reason’ I mean the kind of rationality we draw on when we calculate the most economical 
application of means to a given end. Maximum efficiency, the best cost-output ratio, is its measure of 
success.” 
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meanings provided by the pre-18th century Great Chain of Being” for moral and spiritual 
guidance.6 To arrive at an understanding of whom we have become and of the sources 
that have given rise to the powerful cluster of moral demands that we feel today, an 
exposition of the modern self thus assumes a sense of urgency in Taylor’s thought, an 
urgency that is manifestly absent in—if not antithetical to—Proctor’s normative outlook 
stated above. One could argue that both thinkers ascribe to a form of “moral absolutism,” 
but Taylor would ultimately fault Proctor for the narrowness of his outlook and the 
impossibility of his attempt to articulate a humanistic ethic bereft of any reference to his 
own modern identity:  
What I hope emerges from this lengthy account of the growth of the modern identity is 
how all-pervasive it is, how much it envelops us, and how deeply we are implicated in it: 
in a sense of self defined by powers of disengaged reason as well as of creative 
imagination, in characteristic modern understandings of freedom and dignity and rights, 
in the ideals of self-fulfillment and expression, and in demands of universal benevolence 
and justice.7  
Intrigued by this difference, I wrote Proctor a series of questions addressing the 
apparent tendency of his book to disparage the “modern” self. In particular, I posed to 
him the following questions: What is the relevance of the past? Why are we moderns, 
according to your book, unable to learn from other modern, interior selves? And what, if 
anything, can be done to convince our contemporaries that there is more to life than 
material possessions, that education should be edification, and that philosophy, as Pierre 
Hadot argues so well in his book What is Ancient Philosophy, should be a “way of life”?   
                                                 
6 Charles Taylor. “Comments and Replies,” Inquiry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 
LIV, 1, March 1994, p. 248.   
7 Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2001, p. 503. 
                                                                                                       7
Professor Proctor’s response reemphasized to me the importance of thinking 
within a tradition, of interpreting the past to address the moral and spiritual needs of the 
present. There is, of course, some truth in two of the common answers given for studying 
the past: “those who do not study history are condemned to repeat it;” and “we 
understand better who we are if we understand how we and our society came into being 
in time.”8 But more importantly, for Proctor, working within a tradition gives order and 
meaning to one’s life. It provides one with a framework for addressing moral and 
spiritual questions, and it imposes a necessary limitation on our intellectual choices, 
allowing for a recognizable “starting position” from which one may engage in a dialogue 
with another tradition; and in this regard, there is a great deal that we moderns can learn 
from our contemporaries, “but only if we can understand them in terms of the whole 
history of Western thought, culture, and civilization.”9 To relegate ourselves to what 
Christopher Lasch refers to as “the windowless room of the present” not only risks a 
perpetual pathological narcissism, but it disregards other, more meaningful modalities of 
self-realization that derive from comparing and contrasting one’s self  with those pre-
modern selves who turned outward, not inward, in their trials.10  
Within this context, the focus for my senior honors study centers on two pivotal 
figures within the Western tradition, both of whom exerted a tremendous influence on 
western conceptions of the human person and its place within a greater moral and 
spiritual order: St. Augustine of Hippo and Francesco Petrarch. Above all others, I choose 
St. Augustine and Petrarch for three reasons. First, not only are Augustine and Petrarch 
essential for understanding the roots of the Western identity, but they themselves 
                                                 
8 See: George Santayana. The Life of Reason. New York: Prometheus Books, 1998.  
9 Robert. E. Proctor. Correspondence with Author. January 24th, 2005.  
10 Ibid. p. 7 
                                                                                                       8
heralded the coming of two monumental intellectual movements within the West itself: 
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance respectively. Second, the similarities and 
intertexuality between the two thinkers is itself a topic worthy of careful study. Both 
Augustine and Petrarch are noted for their penchant for introspection, their relationship to 
antiquity, their acute sense of historical perspective, their relentless search for happiness, 
and the extent to which this search is deeply intertwined with their lives. It is noteworthy 
that Augustine figures prominently in two of Petrarch’s principle works: “The Ascent of 
Mont Ventoux” and Secretum, a consolatory (consolatio) dialogue that Petrarch imagines 
between himself and St. Augustine. Finally, for reasons noted above, both thinkers place 
a premium on the ethical dimensions of life, on discerning the just path for living 
virtuously and attaining happiness (eudaemonia). And yet, in spite of the common ethical 
trajectory between the two, Augustine and Petrarch locate their paths to happiness 
through opposing channels. Petrarch, reared as a Christian, turns away from the Christian 
scholasticism of the time as a means to combat the contingency, pain and suffering of the 
world and looks, instead, to the power of the written word and the transformative effect 
of historical examples to fashion an identity. Augustine, born a pagan and mired in the 
sin of “worldliness” from a young age, is initially drawn to the rhetoric and knowledge of 
pagan texts, but eventually sees within them not an independent source of wisdom, but 
traces of God, of a divinely ordered world (logos: the Word of Christ). Adhering to 
Christian doctrine becomes for Augustine not an impediment to living a moral life, as it 
was for Petrarch,11 but a moral compass leading to his salvation.  
                                                 
11 It is important to stress here that Petrarch never did abjure his faith as a Christian; indeed, Petrarch 
remained a Christian throughout his life. His “turning away” from Christianity reflected primarily his views 
toward what the religion of Christianity had become in early 14th century Europe: a degeneration of 
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The divergent responses of Augustine and Petrarch toward Christianity as a 
means to fashion an identity and situate the human person within a greater moral order 
are emblematic of a larger, more significant difference between the two. Augustine was, 
for all his concerted introspection and locutions of the mind as an “interior man” (homo 
interior), markedly ancient with respect to his conception of the human person. The 
extent that he may be construed as advocating a modern, interior conception of the self 
can only be sustained through an awareness that the culminating effects of Augustine’s 
interiority, in its tendencies and, more importantly, in its goals, lie beyond the self and 
toward the “invisible things” of God. Augustine’s conception of personal identity is thus 
ultimately “extensive” in its orientation, as that which turns inward in order to be “drawn 
upward.”12  
Petrarch’s conception of personal identity retains Augustinian strands of 
interiority but contrary to Augustine, Petrarch’s efforts are not circumscribed by an 
awareness that man is ultimately dependent upon the grace of God to rectify the 
perversity of the human will. Petrarch’s existential humanism, as it is often referred to, 
derives precisely from the fact that Petrarch was unable to locate in medieval theology an 
ethic capable of providing meaning and reason in the face of the many tragedies that 
colored his life. As a result, one often sees in Petrarch a conception of personal identity 
that is mired in subjectivity, fragmented and unhinged from previous moral orders but 
nevertheless capable of serving as the central source of all values and objectivity.13 
Petrarch thus expounds a deeply personal understanding of self-identity, one that is often 
                                                                                                                                                 
theology into methodology, narrow specialization and an obsession with logical and linguistic analysis. As 
Petrarch notes in Le familiari: “Our vanity has turned theology into dialectic” (Fam. X, 5 and 8).   
12 Op. cit. Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self, p. 134. 
13 Giuseppe Mazzotta. The Worlds of Petrarch. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993, p. 83. Cf. Petrarch’s 
Trionfi, Secretum and Familiares.  
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identified by recent scholars as indicative of a turning point in western thought from 
ancient, extensive conceptions of the human person to more modern, interior notions of 
selfhood.  
Taking this contrast as a point of departure, this essay seeks to analyze in greater 
detail the thought of Augustine and Petrarch as regards their varying conceptions of 
personal identity and its relation to a greater moral and spiritual order. A broader, but 
closely related, aim of this thesis is to highlight how this search for self-understanding 
becomes increasingly internalized over time. If one begins with the thought of Plato, one 
may say that this search has moved from an external domain, from a view that man must 
go beyond himself to accede to a realm of higher moral and spiritual sources, to an 
interior one, to a notion that higher moral and spiritual sources are made in the image of 
an autonomous self, not found. Before delving into the thought of Augustine on the 
subject, the essay begins with an introductory chapter on the philosophy of Plato in order 
to lay the intellectual foundations upon which Augustine draws to articulate his vision of 
the human person. Chapters two through four comprise the bulk of the thesis and aim, 
together with the introductory chapter, to provide a sequential look at three attempts 
within the Western tradition to articulate the nature of personal identity. Chapter two 
focuses on the thought of Augustine and may be divided into three sections: 1) The 
Soul’s Search for Knowledge, Truth and God, 2) Memory and the Interior Teacher, and 
3) Human Nature and its Redemption. Chapter three discusses the nature and influence of 
St. Anselm’s ontological proof for the existence of God on Petrarch’s intellectual outlook 
and seeks, by extension, to lay the groundwork for a more detailed exposition of 
Petrarch’s views on medieval scholasticism, love, and the experience of death and 
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contingency. The final chapter deals principally with the figure of Petrarch. It provides a 
detailed look at the reasons that gave rise to his intellectual outlook on man as well as the 
express nature and implications of his subjective conception of the human person. The 
essay concludes with a brief attempt to draw out more explicitly the similarities and 
differences between Augustine and Petrarch with a view to identifying where and how 
their conceptions of personal identity diverge.  
 Before moving on, it is important to clarify two caveats that run throughout this 
essay, one dealing with language and the other with methodology. As regards language, I 
have explicitly avoided the use of the term “self” and opted instead for the term “person,” 
“mind,” or “soul” when referring to the works of Plato, Augustine, Anselm, and, to a 
lesser extent, Petrarch.14 This is because none of the thinkers in question advance an 
explicit or unified “theory of the self.” Preoccupation with the nature of selfhood and its 
attendant formulations is principally a modern exercise, and it would be incongruous to 
transpose a modern understanding of this term onto thinkers for which the term had a 
vastly different meaning.15 Consequently, the methodology of this paper will proceed by 
way of reflection. It will attempt to elicit and formulate a clearer understanding of 
Augustine’s and Petrarch’s approaches to personal identity by looking for reflections of 
                                                 
14 I should note that this assumption is considerably relaxed in Chapter IV. My decision to do so was 
motivated, in large part, by Petrarch’s role as a transitional figure to modernity.  
15 By way of example, R.S. Pine-Coffin’s popular edition of Augustine’s Confessions translates “tum in illa 
grandi rixa interioris domus meae, quam fortiter excitaveram cum anima mea in cubiculo nostro, corde 
meo, tam vultu quam mente turbatus invado Alypium” as “My inner self was a house divided against itself. 
In the heat of the fierce conflict which I had stirred up against my soul in our common abode, my heart, I 
turned upon Alypius” (Book VIII, Chapter VIII). As I would argue, this translation superimposes a modern 
term, namely, the term “self,” onto a text for which the phrase “in illa rixa interioris domus meae” had 
quite a different meaning. I would translate the above passage as follows: “Then, with my inner house 
[interioris domus meae] in conflict with itself, which I had so fiercely raised against my soul in our 
common chamber, my heart, I turned, troubled in both mind and countenance [vultu], to Alypius.”  
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their views on the subject in a variety of their writings on God, psychology, metaphysics, 
epistemology, and language.  
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Chapter I: Eros, Ergon and Periagōgē: Plato’s Vision of the Moral 
Order  
 
 
“We are fired into this world with a madness that comes from the Gods.”  
 
                           –Plato: Phaedrus 
 
Introduction  
 
In 1929, Alfred North Whitehead wrote, “The safest general characterization of 
the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”16 
Although this appraisal of the Western philosophical tradition certainly overlooks its 
dialogical character—western philosophy being more of a conversation across time than 
a lengthy commentary on its earliest proponents—it does give the reader a sense of just 
how influential the thought of Plato was for future generations of philosophers. This 
influence is most readily apparent in the works of the early Christian philosophers, 
particularly those of St. Augustine of Hippo. In this chapter, I wish to touch upon a 
number of themes within Plato’s work that influence the thought and development of 
Augustine’s philosophical outlook. I concentrate, in particular, on aspects of Plato’s 
thought that Augustine will later have to reconcile with his Christian faith, including 
Plato’s views on wisdom, recollection and the love and direction of the human soul. A 
broader aim of this chapter is to provide an intellectual background against which the 
                                                 
16 Alfred North Whitehead. Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. New York: Macmillan 
Company, 1929; New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960, p. 39.  
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sequential nature of western attempts to define personhood in terms of locale, such as 
“inner” and “outer,” “interiority” and “exteriority,” will become more apparent.  
 
Love, Understanding and the Search for Wisdom  
 
All men desire to be wise; and to be wise, according to Plato, is the ability to view 
all of reality in light of the Forms (eidos, idea). A man capable of such a feat would not 
only possess a true understanding (noein, noēsis, nous) of the natural order of things but 
he would also rightly perceive how things “ought” to be. That is to say, Plato presents an 
epistemology that is intimately connected to a normative understanding of the world of 
experience: to know what is right necessarily entails doing (teche) right.17 As Plato has 
Socrates state in the Gorgias:  
Socrates: Now is not the man who has learned the art of carpentry a carpenter? 
Gorgias: Yes 
Socrates: And he who has learned the art of music a musician? 
Gorgias: Yes.  
Socrates: And he who has learned medicine a physician? And so too on the same 
principle, the man who has learned anything becomes in each case such as his knowledge 
makes him?  
                                                 
17 There is a conspicuous shortage of available literature on Plato’s conception of the freedom of the human 
will. My research has lead me to believe that Plato is, to a large extent, deterministic in his outlook. This 
assertion is based on two premises: 1) Plato’s exclusive, a-priori definition of the harmonious and 
rationally guided soul: “The first [of the three parts of the soul] is the part with which a person learns 
[rational], and the second the part with which he gets angry [spirit]. As for the third…we called it the 
appetitive part, because of the intensity of its appetites for food, drink, sex…but we also called it the 
money-loving part [desire]…And doesn’t this part rule in some people’s souls, while one of the other 
parts—whichever it happens to be—rules in other people’s?...And isn’t that the reason we say that there are 
three primary kinds of people: philosophic, victory loving, and profit-loving [my emphasis]?” (Plato. 
Republic. Translated by G.M.A. Grube. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1992, 580d-581c). 
2) The necessary relationship that Plato draws between knowledge and just action (“virtue is knowledge”), 
which leaves little to no room for the freedom of individual choice in matters of moral concern—a claim 
that Augustine will later contest.  
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Gorgias: Certainly.  
Socrates: Then according to this principle he who learned justice is just.18   
As the above analogy suggests, human excellence (aretē) derives from a direct 
experience of knowledge. Only the musician possesses an understanding about the nature 
and use of his or her instrument; just as only a carpenter with a direct experience of the 
act of carpentry may be said to be possessive of a true understanding of his or her craft. 
The “maker” possesses, at best, only a true belief about the making of musical 
instruments or furniture, one that, although true, remains entirely dependent upon the 
user’s knowledge of what makes an instrument or piece of furniture better or worse.19  
 Plato’s definition of knowledge follows from this distinction between mere belief, 
or opinion (doxa), and understanding. As noted above, belief and knowledge may both 
possess the quality of being “true,” but only knowledge is necessarily true: one cannot be 
said to know falsely. Belief, by contrast, is only contingently true, and may change at any 
moment according to the availability of information, context and/or the subjective 
motives of the agent. What separates knowledge from belief is that knowledge, in 
addition to being true, is “tied down” by a logos (account) of the reason why:  
For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they 
are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man’s mind, so that they are not 
worth much until one ties them down by giving an account of the reason why…After 
they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in 
place.20 
                                                 
18 Plato. Gorgias. Translated by W.C. Helmbold. London: Prentice Hall, 1952, 460b. 
19 Julia Annas. An Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, Chapter 8. 
20 Plato. Meno. Translated by G.M.A. Grube in Plato’s Meno. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 
Inc., 1992, 98A.  
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Although some scholars have argued that this interpretation of knowledge entails a “two-
worlds view” whereby the objects of knowledge are said to be distinct from the objects of 
opinion irrespective of their veracity, it is clear that Plato is speaking not of two separate 
worlds but of two different, interdependent perspectives. Those possessive of knowledge 
perceive reality as an ordered whole. Their perspective is not limited to particulars, nor is 
it easily persuaded by the arbitrary whims of others. It is the result of a meticulously 
crafted logos about the objects of this world; and because this dialectic of reason 
proceeds initially by way of the world of experience, the objects of its knowledge are not 
distinct from the objects of belief but build upon them toward more inclusive and broader 
forms of knowledge.  
 These broader, more inclusive forms of knowledge are what Plato refers to as the 
world of the “Forms.” In contrast to the world of sensible experience, the world of the 
Forms is an ideal reality, one that exists independently from the world of experience but 
nevertheless accounts for and makes intelligible its content. Accordingly, all objects 
within the sensible world derive their essential characteristics from their participation in 
the Forms: large stones, buildings and mountains may all differ greatly from one another 
in terms of their material composition and appearance, but they all share the common 
characteristic of “largeness” due to their participation in the Form of largeness. By 
tracing the participation of the visible world in the intelligible world of the Forms, the 
philosopher embarks upon the path toward wisdom. 
 At the apex of this journey stands the Form of the Good, Plato’s metaphysical 
“First Principle.” The Form of the Good accounts for and sustains all partial goods, both 
intelligible and visible, and functions, by extension, as the ultimate source and object of 
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all knowledge, as that which “gives truth to the things known and the power to know to 
the knower.”21 Unlike the lower Forms, which proceed “not to a first principle but to a 
conclusion,”22 the truth of the Form of the Good is self-evident: it requires no further 
explanation to account for, or sustain, its existence. It is, as Plato terms it, a point of final 
“rest” and “security” for the human soul seeking certainty in a world of change.23   
What is interesting to note for present purposes is the manner in which the 
apprehension of this highest good is described. No longer considered part of the sensible 
or intelligible realms of being, the apprehension of the Form of the Good is often 
described by Plato in mystical terms as a form of vision, a “seeing” with the “eye of the 
soul.” As Plato writes in Book VII of the Republic:  
In the knowable realm, the form of the good is the last thing to be seen, and it is reached 
only with difficulty. Once one has seen it, however, one must conclude that it is the cause 
of all that is correct and beautiful in anything, that it provides both light and its source in 
the visible realm, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth and 
understanding, so that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or in public must see it.24 
There are two important points to draw out from this passage. First, it is clear that Plato 
conceives of knowledge as a form of direct and immediate experience: to see the Good is 
at once to understand the Good. When this moment of pure understanding is reached, the 
distinctions that formerly separated the “knower” (the human soul) and the “object to be 
known” (the Good) effectively melt away. There is, as F.E. Cranz observes, a necessary 
                                                 
21 Op. cit. Plato. Republic, 508e.  
22 Ibid.  510b. The division between “lower” and “higher” forms derives from Plato’s division of the 
intelligible world into two parts: a) those forms which serve as hypothetical constructs from which one may 
reason back to the visible world (“the conclusion”) to account for the existence of certain objects or values 
and b) those forms which, although remaining hypothetical in nature, are employed to account for more 
basic concepts within the intelligible world itself. See Melchert’s “eagle” analogy in: Norman Melchert. 
The Great Conversation. New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2002.  p. 129.   
23 Ibid. 533d 
24 Ibid. 517b-c [my emphasis] 
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conjunction between the “knower” and the “known” across a single realm of being25 
which, in Plato’s case, is itself “beyond being.”26 A second point to draw out from this 
passage is that this highest good is of a public and common domain, accessible to 
“anyone who is to act sensibly in private or in public.” The attainment of the Good may 
be limited to the select few—Plato refers to this privileged elite as “the philosopher 
kings,” but its location nevertheless lies beyond the human soul, beyond the realm of 
individual thought and feeling. As a result, the focus of the lover of wisdom (philosophia) 
fastens upon an external field of common objects to be known, not the subjective and 
particularized thoughts of the agent.27   
 Plato notes near the end of Book VII of the Republic that one’s ability to accede 
to this field of higher moral and spiritual sources depends upon the direction in which the 
soul is facing, a task which he entrusts to the powers of education (paideia). “Education,” 
Plato states, “….isn’t the craft of putting sight into the soul. Education takes for granted 
that sight is there but that it isn’t turned the right way or looking where it ought to look, 
and it tries to redirect it appropriately.”28 This view suggests that there is a preexisting 
desire and capacity within the soul to attain wisdom; all the craft of education must do is 
guide the soul in the proper direction. The issue at stake is thus not whether the soul loves 
the good, for this is almost certainly the case, but whether the soul is able to see the good 
                                                 
25 For a more extensive elaboration on the subject of ancient conjunctive vision please refer to: F.E. Cranz, 
The Reorientation of Western Thought c. 1100A.D. The Break with the Ancient Tradition and its 
Consequences for Renaissance and Reformation. Prepared for Duke University Center for Medieval and 
Renaissance Studies, 1982.   
26 Plato. Timaeus. Translated by H.D.P. Lee. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965, 41 (9). See also: Plato. 
Republic, 509b: “Therefore, you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge owe their being 
known to the good, but their being is also due to it, although the good is not being, but superior to it in rank 
and power [my emphasis].”  
27 As we shall see in chapter two, Augustine has a very different understanding of the domain and activity 
of knowledge. Op. cit. Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self, p. 130.  
28 Op. cit. Plato. Republic, 518d. 
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and hence know in which direction it should channel its endogenous desires. As Plato has 
Diotima, an expert on the subject of love, state to Socrates in the Symposium:   
Diotima: Do you think this wish and this desire (the love of the good) are common to all 
mankind, and that everyone wants always to possess what is good?  
Socrates: I think it is common to all men.  
Diotima: In that case, Socrates, why do we not describe all men as lovers, if everyone 
always loves the same thing? 
Socrates: I don’t know. I agree with you, it is surprising.  
Diotima: Not really. We abstract part of love, and call it by the name of the whole—
love—and then for the other parts we use different names…In general, for anyone, any 
desire for goodness and happiness is love—and it is a powerful and unpredictable force. 
But there are various ways of pursuing this desire—through money-making, through 
physical fitness, through philosophy—which do not entitle their devotees to call 
themselves lovers, or describe their activity as loving. Those who pursue one particular 
mode of loving, and make that there concern, have taken over the name of the whole 
(love, loving, and lovers).29  
In a very broad sense, Plato would agree that all men are lovers: we all lack and long for 
that which will make us happy and secure with ourselves, namely the beautiful and the 
good. But he would caution us in thinking that this common desire bespeaks a common 
love for the Good itself. Indeed, only the select few are able to progress to the highest and 
purest stages of love: from the love of the physical and mundane to the love of souls, 
human institutions, knowledge and, finally, to the Beautiful itself.30 As will be discussed 
later on, this form of love is not based on particular modes of loving, but on a vision of a 
greater moral order within which one is a small but indispensable part. Those who remain 
                                                 
29 Plato. Symposium. Translated by Tom Griffith. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, 205a-
205d.  
30 Ibid. 210d  
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mired in the more physical manifestations of Eros may long for the good, indeed they 
may believe themselves to be rightly pursuing the good, but to refer to them as lovers is 
merely to “abstract part of love, and call it by the name of the whole.” 
 
The Structure and Immortality of the Soul  
 
To claim that those who remain transfixed by the physical manifestations of Eros 
do so because their souls are not properly directed toward the light of the Good is to tell 
only half the story. What is not stated explicitly by Plato is that man’s ability to see the 
Good, and consequently to love the Good, can be impeded or facilitated by the structure 
and immortality of the human soul. In what follows, I shall provide a brief sketch of 
Plato’s views on these two themes which will, in turn, lead us into a more general 
discussion of Plato’s moral doctrine and its implications for Augustine’s interiority. 
  Plato offers two arguments in support of the immortality of the soul: a) the theory 
of reminiscence and b) the “self-mover” thesis. Plato’s theory of reminiscence derives 
from a fundamental problem that Plato faced as regards man’s ability to recognize and 
assimilate the knowledge wrought by the Forms. The problem is this: how, unless man 
had a prior knowledge of, say, Justice itself—the Form of Justice—could man recognize 
justice within a community or, for that matter, within his own soul? Simply aggregating 
common, intercommunal perceptions of justice or adhering to one society’s definition of 
justice over another would surely not correspond to “Perfect Justice.” Perfect Justice 
embodies all just actions; simply dissecting societal norms and social practices into 
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individual components would not only distort the unifying nature of justice, it would 
result in an abstract and culturally relative understanding of what Justice itself entails.  
Plato resolves this apparent epistemological crisis by postulating a theory of 
reminiscence, whereby an unconscious knowledge of the Forms is presumed to be ever 
present in the human soul. The process of “learning” reactivates this knowledge by 
bringing it into the purview of consciousness.31 When one apperceives the truths of 
“Perfect Justice” or “the Perfect Square” one is, in effect, recollecting a prior, but latent 
knowledge of the Form of Justice and the Form of the Square. “We must have acquired 
knowledge of the nature of the Equal Itself before we began to see and to hear and to use 
our other senses,” Plato concludes, “if we were going to refer to that criterion things that 
appeared to the senses equal, on the ground that they all do their best to be like it though 
they are inferior.”32 Unlike more modern, empirical notions of the mind, Plato does not 
view the memory as a repository for information processed via sensible experience.33 On 
the contrary, our memories are comprised of dim, but very real visions of a higher reality 
which may be “recollected” through the medium of education.  
Plato’s “self-mover” thesis offers an alternate proof of the immortality of the soul, 
one that is not beset by some of the conspicuous deficiencies of the recollection theory.34 
In his Phaedrus Plato states, “For any body which has its source of motion outside itself 
                                                 
31 F.M. Cornford. Before and After Socrates. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 71. 
32 Plato. Phaedo. Translated by R.S. Bluck. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1955, 75b.  
33 David Hume, in his Treatise of Human Nature, will later refer to this cluster of personal memories 
grounded in sensible experience as the only justification for believing in the existence of a “personal self.”  
34 Plato’s theory of reminiscence falls short of a convincing proof of the immortality of the soul for three 
reasons: 1) it is entirely possible to conceive of alternate ways in which one might account for man’s ability 
to recognize and assimilate knowledge, Aristotle’s model of induction perhaps being the most relevant 
from an historical point of view; 2) even if the premise were granted that the soul predated the existence of 
the body, there is no reason to believe that it would not perish with the body; 3) and even if it were 
demonstrated that the soul outlived the existence of the body, what proof is there that its life cycle will not 
eventually come to an end?  
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is soulless, whereas that which has it within itself and from itself is ensouled, this being 
the nature of the soul; and if this is so—that that which moves itself is nothing other than 
soul, [the] soul will be necessarily something which neither comes into being nor dies.”35 
Plato observes that there are, broadly speaking, two categories of things in the world: 
those which are possessive of their own source of motion, and those which move only 
when acted upon by an external force or object. To the latter category belongs the body, 
which moves only when acted upon. The soul, however, possesses its own source of 
energy, its own internal source of motion. To think of the soul as possessive of its own 
life force leads Plato to the conclusion that the soul is immortal, “for that which is always 
in movement is immortal; that which moves something else and is moved by something 
else, in ceasing from movement, ceases from living. Only that which moves itself, 
because it does not abandon itself, never stops moving.”36  
Plato’s concept of the human soul stands in tension with the material and 
temporal realities in which the soul is situated. The soul is of an indestructible and eternal 
essence. Its movement is upward, driven by a longing to reunite with the higher reality 
from which it came. But in its efforts, the soul is beset by the strictures of the material 
world, particularly those of the body. It is circumscribed by that which is temporal, 
changing and material and is, as a result, enmeshed within a world that is not its rightful 
home. The study of philosophy, for those who choose it as a “way of life,” ought 
naturally to enjoin its practitioners to free the soul from the restraints of the body by 
actively engendering its separation. “True philosophers,” Plato exhorts, “…are always 
eager to free her [the soul], and…this very thing is the philosopher’s occupation, a 
                                                 
35 Plato. Phaedrus. Translated by C.J. Rowe. Wiltshire: Aris and Philips Ltd., 1986, 245e5.   
36 Ibid. 245d 
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freeing or separation of soul from body.”37 Plato goes so far as to state that the true lover 
of wisdom should “practice death”38—insofar as death signifies a “separation of soul 
from body”—in order to facilitate the deliverance of the divine spirit within man from the 
shackles of the somatic world.  
Plato’s mediations on the human soul focus not only on the ethereal but also on 
the practical, on how to live a morally good life in this world despite the soul’s drive 
toward other-worldliness. Before moving on to an exploration of Plato’s moral doctrine, 
it will be necessary to first discuss how Plato construes the internal structure of the soul; 
for Plato’s philosophy in this respect is intimately connected to his moral doctrine and to 
his views on the nature of justice as a concomitant property of the soul and the 
community at large.  
Plato presents us with a view of the soul that is internally complex and 
persistently at odds with itself. In the Phaedrus, Plato invites us to view the internal 
structure of the soul as analogous to “the combined power of a winged team of horses and 
their charioteer.”39 The charioteer symbolizes the rational part of the soul (logistikon), the 
part which guides the power of the winged steeds in the proper direction. This role is 
particularly pronounced in times of inner conflict, where one part of the soul desires one 
good against the wellbeing or good of another. The task of the charioteer is thus 
extraordinarily difficult, for only in the case of the gods are the horses and charioteers 
                                                 
37 Op. cit. Plato. Phaedo. Translated by R.S. Bluck, 67D-E.  
38 Ibid. 67E 
39 Op. cit. Plato. Phaedrus. Translated by C.J. Rowe, 246 a5. Note the reference to wings in this analogy. 
Throughout Plato’s middle and later works he refers to the soul through such metaphors: the soul has an 
inbuilt desire to fly upwards, to escape the bounds of this world in order to enter that of the next. As Plato 
notes in a later section of the dialogue: “The natural property of a wing is to carry what is heavy upwards, 
lifting it aloft to the region where the race of the gods resides” (Plato. Phaedrus. Translated by C.J. Rowe, 
246e).  
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both of good stock.40 In the human soul the charioteer must oversee the unruly character 
of two seeds, of which only one is declared good. The one good steed, the white steed, 
represents thumos, or spirit, which corresponds to the part of the soul that acts out of a 
motivation for honor and glory under the guidance of “spoken command alone.”41 The 
spirit animates the human person, instilling in us the rage that accompanies perceived acts 
of injustice and the joy we feel when looking upon the face of a loved one. Without the 
spirit there would be no passion, no motivation to do what is right; a charioteer without a 
“white steed” would be nothing more than a brain-in-a-vat, capable only of thought but 
never of action. But just as the charioteer needs his or her white steed to properly guide 
the soul, so too does the white steed require the guidance of the charioteer; for without 
reason’s temperance, thumos is nothing more than a desire to be rooted in the mundane, 
in the world of the Homeric heroes who live for nothing more than to have their names 
resound throughout the pages of history.  
The third part of the soul, and that which is the most unruly, is represented by the 
black steed. Plato describes this part of the soul in disparaging terms, as that which is 
“crooked in shape…a random collection of parts, with a short, powerful neck, flat-nosed, 
black-skinned, grey-eyed, bloodshot, companion of excess and boastfulness, shaggy 
around the ears, deaf, hardly yielding to whip and goad together.”42 The black steed 
represents desire (epithumētikon) which, as the above passage suggests, is almost entirely 
impervious to the command of reason. Plato often refers to this part of the human soul as 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 246b 
41 Ibid. 253d-e 
42 Ibid. 253e 
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the appetitive part, as that which spawns blind action and an insatiable appetite for “food, 
drink, sex, and all things associated with them.”43  
In the soul of a god, these parts function harmoniously44; but in the human soul, 
the three parts exist in perpetual conflict with one another. At any given moment and in 
any given person, any one of these parts may dominate: “And doesn’t this part [the 
appetitive part] rule in some people’s souls, while one of the other parts—whichever its 
happens to be—rule’s in other people’s...And isn’t that the reason we say that there are 
three primary kinds of people: philosophic, victory-loving, and profit-loving?”45 
Although this view is somewhat deterministic in nature,46 Plato retains a strong vision of 
how the three parts ought to interrelate, and of the possibility of man to attain this end of 
inner harmony despite the recalcitrant and fissiparous nature of desire to detract from 
reason’s command.  
 
Plato’s Moral Doctrine: Inner Harmony, Justice and Conversion   
 
Plato’s moral doctrine, by modern lights, is highly rationalist in nature. Man is 
considered good when reason rules, when reason commands the allegiance of spirit and 
desire. When such a configuration is present in the human soul, man is said to be 
possessive of an inner “self-control” (kreittō autou), and of a moderation and temperance 
formerly known only to the gods. To be marked by self-control signifies that reason 
                                                 
43 Op cit. Plato. Republic. Translated by G.M.A. Grube, 580d-e. 
44 “Now in the case of the gods,” Plato writes, “horses and charioteers are all both good and of good stock; 
whereas in the case of the rest there is a mixture” (Op. cit. Plato. Phaedrus. Translated by C.J. Rowe, 
2465b). 
45 Op cit. Plato. Republic. Translated by G.M.A. Grube, 581c.  
46 See Footnote #3 
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subsumes the categories of spirit and desire: not only does reason guide and judge the 
soul as a whole, but it also motivates and leads. Our search for truth is no longer moved 
by blind desire or a distant hope for eternal glory, but by the tempered wisdom of a soul 
that possesses inner harmony (harmonia).47  
 Why should reason rule? Because reason’s very function (ergon), its essence, is to 
rule; just as desire’s function is to move and that of the spirit’s is to animate. It is one of 
the great ironies of Plato’s philosophy that the very functions of each part of the soul by 
nature conflict, and yet without each part performing its own function no soul will 
experience the inner harmony, unity, order (kosmos), and calm that it so desires. To reach 
this state ought therefore to be the end (telos) to which all men aspire; for any other 
configuration leaves the human person torn, agitated and persistently restless. A man 
whose soul is ruled by his appetites will never obtain the “rest” and “security” that 
certainty and self-possession provide for he will always be stung by the insatiable 
appetites of his desire.  
 Plato’s moral doctrine, in the primacy that it gives to rational self-rule and in the 
unity of place to which it ascribes all thoughts and feeling,48 represents a dramatic 
                                                 
47 It is understandable, therefore, why Plato would argue for much of Book VI of the Republic that only 
philosophers—the true lovers of wisdom—should rule the state; for only philosophers, who persistently 
seek out rational self-rule, would possess the self-control and moderation necessary to reign with virtue, 
honor and wisdom.  
48 According to the conventional wisdom of the time (Homer), there was no place readily identifiable as a 
unique center for all thought and feeling: there existed no single word for what we now understand to be 
the “soul,” “self” or “mind.” Within Homeric verse there included, among others: psychē (the life force that 
escapes form the body upon its death), thumos (spirit, that which animates man to do great deeds), noos 
(loosely translated as mind or understanding), phrenes (related to the lungs), and kradiē (related to the 
heart). This dissipation of the self, so to speak, was complicated by the fact that one’s ability to accede to 
higher fields of moral and spiritual understanding often depended on the actions and desires of a god, a fact 
which does not accord with more modern understandings of moral responsibility and duty. There was as, 
Bruno Snell and Charles Taylor observe, a fragmentation of the self into physical compartments located at 
various points throughout the body. Plato’s centering of these resources, that is, the unity he confers on our 
various centers of thought and feeling, exerts a fundamental and inexorable impact upon the western 
tradition, one that serves as a strong influence on the thought of St. Augustine. For a more extensive 
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departure from the prevailing moral wisdom of the time. Contrary to the then current 
warrior ethic of external displays of one’s courage and strength and to the more abstract 
notions of a poetic morality based on self-rapture and divine inspiration, Plato enjoins us 
to look deep within ourselves to accede to a higher ground of moral and spiritual sources; 
and in this regard, Plato may be read as contributing to an embryonic interiority that is, 
by now, endemic in western society. What is of principle concern is not the pleasures and 
materiality of the external world of the polis but the inner disposition of the soul, the 
sense of unity and self-possession that one feels when reason rules.49 As Plato has 
Socrates state in Book IV of the Republic: 
…justice...isn’t concerned with someone’s doing his own externally, but with what is 
inside him, with what is truly himself and his own. One who is just does not allow any 
part of himself to do the work of another part or allow the various classes within him to 
meddle with each other. He regulates well what is really his own and rules himself.50 
But in two very important respects, this interiority is qualified by Plato’s abiding 
commitment to the principle of justice and to the weight that he gives to an external 
vision of the Good to calibrate the direction of the human soul. There is much scholarly 
debate regarding the antecedents of Plato’s commitment to the principle of justice within 
the community: was Plato’s vision of the rightly ordered individual soul a necessary pre-
condition for his vision of the ideal polis? Or did Plato merely extrapolate the qualities of 
what he already presumed to be justice within the polis onto the human soul? Regardless 
of one’s views on the subject, it is indisputable that the two—justice within the soul and 
justice within the community—are inextricably linked and, when taken together, form the 
                                                                                                                                                 
treatment of this subject please refer to: a) Bruno Snell. The Discovery of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1951 and b) Op. cit. Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self, p. 118.   
49 Op. cit. Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self, pp.120-121. 
50 Op. cit. Plato. Republic. Translated by G.M.A. Grube, 443D [my emphasis]. 
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central pillar of Plato’s argument in the Republic.51 Just actions inevitably flow from a 
soul that is marked by self-rule and inner harmony; analogously, a just polis, 
administered by a philosopher king, would inevitably produce the moral climate 
necessary to cultivate justice within the individual. It is inconceivable for Plato to assume 
that a just soul could, by its own accord, possess inner justice and yet act immorally 
within the external realm of the polis: 
Socrates: If we had to come to an agreement about whether someone similar in nature 
and training to our [ideal and just] city had embezzled a deposit of gold and silver that he 
had accepted, who do you think would consider him to have done it rather than someone 
who isn’t like him?  
Glaucon: No one 
Socrates: And would he have anything to do with temple robberies, thefts, betrayals of 
friends in private life or of cities in public life? 
Glaucon: No, nothing… 
Socrates: And isn’t the cause of this that every part within him does its own work, 
whether it’s ruling or being ruled? 
Glaucon: Yes, that and nothing else 
Socrates: Then, are you still looking for justice to be something other than this power, the 
one that produces men and cities of the sort we’ve described? 
                                                 
51 It is worth noting that Plato’s vision of justice, both within the soul and within the community, is itself 
grounded ontologically in the cosmology of the Timaeus. As Plato states: “Now there is but one way to care 
for anything, and that is to provide for it the nourishment and the motions that are proper to it. And the 
motions that have an affinity to the divine part in us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe. These, 
surely, are the ones which each of us should follow. We should redirect the revolutions in our heads that 
were thrown off course at our birth, by coming to learn the harmonies and revolutions of the universe; and 
so bring into conformity with its objects the faculty of our understanding, as it was in its original 
conditions. And when this conformity is complete, we should have achieved our goal: that most excellent 
life offered to humankind by the gods; both now and for ever more” (Plato. Timaeus, 90c–d. Zeyl 
translation, quoted in Johansen 2004, p. 1, n. 2; Robert E Proctor. Cosmos: The Beauty Resulting from 
Order, p. 5). Through its contemplation and imitation of the motions of the heavens, the soul is able to 
reduce its “revolutions” to order. A harmonious soul is an ordered soul, and an ordered soul is one that is 
united with the harmony and beauty of the starry sky.  
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Glaucon: No, I certainly am not.52  
To produce such harmony between the “homo interior,” as St. Augustine shall 
later term it, and the external domain of the polis, is the result of a vision of a larger order 
within which man is situated. The fruits of rational self-rule may be experienced most 
immediately and intimately by the “inner man,” but this achievement is not possible 
without a wider vision of the Good; for our ability to apperceive the correct order within 
ourselves necessarily depends upon our ability to “see” the correct order of the good of 
the whole. Only when the intellect rises above itself to experience a conjunctive vision of 
this wider moral order will it possess the “virtue of reason”53 to properly guide the soul. 
We mentioned earlier that the soul’s ability to see this larger order depends upon the 
direction in which the soul as a whole is facing. It is now clear that this turning of the 
whole soul is more a matter of conversion (periagōgē), of turning from the dark to the 
light, than it is an internal capacity of the soul to logically deduce moral and quantitative 
truths.54 As Plato concludes near the end of Book VII of the Republic, “this [the turning 
of the soul] isn’t, it seems, a matter of spinning a potsherd, but of turning a soul from day 
that is a kind of night to true day—the ascent to what is, which we say is true 
philosophy.”55   
Many of the themes discussed in this chapter will figure prominently in the 
thought and intellectual development of St. Augustine. In particular, Augustine will 
spend much of his mature life working out the implications of Plato’s metaphysics, 
epistemology and psychology for those adhering to Christian doctrine. It is best to think 
                                                 
52 Op. cit. Plato. Republic. Translated by G.M.A. Grube, 443a-c. 
53 Ibid. 518e 
54 See: Op. cit. Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self, pp. 121-122.  
55 Op. cit. Plato. Republic. Translated by G.M.A. Grube, 521c.  
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of Plato, in this regard, as a starting point for future deliberations in the West on the 
nature of the human person and the extent to which one may construe personal identity in 
terms of locale, such as “inner” and “outer,” “interior,” and “exterior.” One of the 
principle aims of this chapter was to illuminate these nascent stages of interiority in 
Plato’s thought, while at the same time eliciting an understanding that such conceptions 
of locale were, for Plato, very much extensive in origin and in destination. The sequential 
nature of this turn inward, however, will become much more apparent when we look at 
the figures of St. Augustine and, later, Francesco Petrarch.   
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Chapter II: St. Augustine and the “Metaphysic of Conversion” 
 
 
“To know his own condition and place, what he owes to things above him and beneath and to himself, to 
understand what he has been made, how he should conduct himself, what he should do and not do—in this 
for man consists self-knowledge.” 
  
                           –High of St. Victor: De Sacramentis 
 
Introduction  
 
Augustine is often overlooked in studies of the history of Western philosophy. 
Indeed, many are apt to view him solely within the parameters of his contributions to 
Christian theology and the clarification of Church Doctrine; and to a degree, this 
assessment is not unfounded. In his later years as bishop of Hippo (396-430 A.D.), a 
period which many scholars consider to be his most fruitful, Augustine’s literary pursuits 
were primarily directed to the development of Christian doctrine and to the repudiation of 
theological controversies raised by his contemporaries.56 From this period one finds such 
works as Confessions, On Christian Doctrine and City of God, all of which, although 
marked by sections of philosophical rigor, are principally theological, historical and 
biographical in nature. As Augustine states in Book VIII of City of God:  
It is not my aim, in this present work, to refute all the baseless opinions of all the 
philosophers, but only those appertaining to theology…And I shall not deal with all the 
theological speculation of philosophers, but confine myself to those thinkers who, 
while admitting the existence of a Divinity and his concern for human affairs, do not 
consider that the worship of one unchangeable God is sufficient for the attainment of a 
                                                 
56 Chief among these were the Manichees, the Pelagians and the Donatists. 
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life of blessedness even after death, but suppose that for this end many gods are to be 
worshipped.57 
It would appear, from passages such as these, that Augustine’s chief concern was not the 
construction of an elaborate philosophical system, but an ardent defense of the Christian 
faith, one reminiscent, perhaps, of the apologetic discourses of Marcianus Aristides 
(Apology c. 140A.D.), Theophilus of Antioch (Ad Autolycum c. 180 A.D.) and Tertullian 
(Prescription Against Heretics c. 200 A.D.).  
 But what this view misses, and, at times, often distorts, is the delicate balance 
Augustine draws between the disciplines of philosophy and theology. That philosophy 
signified for both pagan and Christian the unrelenting love of wisdom Augustine would 
not disagree. The issue at stake, particularly for those Christian thinkers attempting to 
reconcile pagan wisdom with the revealed wisdom of the Christian Gospel, was the scope 
and end (telos) to which one’s intellectual activities were applied. As an inclusive, 
intellectual activity that appertained to the critical ends of human life, pagan philosophy 
carried very little weight within Augustinian discourse; for the ultimate truths of human 
life, and by extension the ends to which we ought to aspire, had already been revealed by 
the divine light of Christ. But if one is to consider philosophy in more general terms, as 
an intellectual activity and method of analysis for clarifying Christian doctrine and 
deepening one’s understanding of the Christian faith, its utility for the “Christian 
philosopher,” and indeed for Augustine, was invaluable. To be sure, its study would 
naturally take a subordinate place to the revealed wisdom of the Gospel, but it would 
nevertheless become an indispensable tool of the Christian philosopher for understanding 
with the mind truths that were at once intuitively grasped by the heart.  
                                                 
57 Augustine. City of God. Edited by David Knowles. Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1972, Book VIII, p. 298.  
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 It is within this context that one may come to appreciate the unity that 
characterizes Augustine’s thought, a unity which presupposes an inextricable link 
between the disciplines of philosophy and theology. Seeing that all men desire happiness 
and truth, philosophy—the love of wisdom—for Augustine entailed the study of where 
such goods were ultimately to be found and the means by which one could obtain them. 
For the Christian philosopher, true wisdom had been revealed by the divine Word (logos) 
and was uniformly to include the love, knowledge and possession of God. But in order to 
understand and clarify this revelation in time for both himself and for those who might 
choose to disbelieve him, the Christian must employ the techniques of philosophy; for 
only in heaven, in clear vision of the “Light Eternal, that alone abidest in Thyself, alone 
knowest Thyself, and, known to Thyself and knowing, lovest and smilest on Thyself,”58 
may he be rightly said to posses and understand the eternal objects of his desire.      
 The close connection that Augustine draws between theology and philosophy 
naturally enjoins him to assimilate and transform into a Christian framework a variety of 
philosophical debates from his pagan predecessors. Chief among these, particularly for 
the purposes of this chapter, is the ancient question regarding the soul’s self-knowledge.  
For Socrates, concern for the soul—the essential component of the human person—was 
considered to be of the utmost importance for constructing a good life. To care for the 
soul, one must necessarily seek out self-knowledge; for without knowledge of the soul, of 
what one knows and does not know, one will not be able to discern knowledge from 
opinion, belief from understanding, and will thus prove incapable of acting virtuously in 
matters of moral concern. The question of self-knowledge has proved to be a perennial 
                                                 
58 Dante Alighieri. Paradiso. Translated by John D. Sinclair. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939, 
XXXIII 124-126: “O luce etterna che sola in te sidi, sola t’intendi, e da te intelletta e intendente te ami e 
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one in the history of western thought, and it is thus no surprise that medieval 
philosophers, Augustine in particular, attached a special importance to it.  
 It should also come as no surprise, however, that once in the hands of the 
Christian philosophers, the question of man’s self-knowledge assumed a novel and 
altogether unprecedented form. In Genesis Book I the Bible states:  
Then God said, Let us make humankind [Heb adam] in our image, according to our 
likeness; and let him have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, 
and over the cattle, and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping 
thing that creeps upon the earth. So God created humankind in his image, in the image of 
God he created them.59 
That man was created in the image of God raised two fundamental questions for Christian 
thinkers: 1) If man is an image of God, of what does this image consist and where does it 
reside? 2) If man is created in the image of God, what are the implications of this truth 
for man’s ability to attain self-knowledge?  
  The problem was essentially a relational one. How could man, in any conceivable 
sense, reflect the virtue and universality of the Divine? From the outset, there was one 
truth upon which all were agreed: whatever man’s constitutive essence, the divine image 
was necessarily located in that which was most noble in man, namely, in his intelligence 
and, by extension, in his freedom.60 Schools of medieval thought naturally diverged over 
the extent to which one was to be emphasized over the other, but the general parameters 
of the philosophical problem remained the same. Augustine’s approach to the question 
was characteristically more elusive: our virtue of being an image of God lies less in our 
                                                 
59 Genesis, Book I 26-27. The New Oxford Annotated Bible. Third Edition. Editor: Michael D. Coogan. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 12.   
60 Etienne Gilson. The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy. Translated by A.H.C. Downes. London: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1991, p. 211. 
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intelligence and freedom per se and more with our innate ability to perceive and abide by 
the wider metaphysical order of which we are a part. “The peace of the whole universe,” 
Augustine notes in City of God, “is the tranquility of order—and order is the arrangement 
of things equal and unequal in a pattern which assigns to each its proper position.”61 To 
discover our rightful place amidst this order was, for Augustine, the only true means to 
attain wisdom. For an awareness of our place within God’s order naturally brings us to a 
consciousness of the order within ourselves. It is here that we may locate the divine 
image and it is through ourselves that we may then turn to God.  
In turning inward, however, the Christian philosopher also confronts a reality that is 
at once inscrutable and shrouded in mystery. For if man is of the Divine image, the very 
depths of his soul participate in the mystery and “incomprehensibility of God.”62 Through 
his perception of God’s created order man may discern certain truths. He may come to 
understand his place within the larger whole, the dominion he holds over nature, and the 
grandeur that characterizes his existence in relation to the “brutes.”63 But experience alone, 
as Etienne Gilson rightly notes, “makes an end of pride,”64 and unless man confronts the 
mystery of which is a part, he is likely to relinquish his innate dignity to the pride and 
presumption that persistently plague human existence. We may thus conclude that self-
knowledge for the Christian philosopher consisted at once of an understanding and a 
mystery, a pride of place and a humility. Fashioned in the image of the divine, man 
occupied a special place within the cosmic order, and needed only look within to locate the 
ultimate object of his love. And yet, in turning inward, the Christian was ultimately 
                                                 
61 Op. cit. Augustine. City of God, Book XIX Ch. 13: “Pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis. Ordo est 
parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribunes disposition.”  
62 Op. cit. Etienne Gilson. The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, p. 220.  
63 Ibid. p. 216 
64 Ibid. p. 216 
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surpassed by a vision that exceeded his own powers of understanding. To be humbled by 
this vision was to risk despair, but only through an intimate awareness of this order could 
the search for self-knowledge truly begin.  
Many of the themes that have been presented thus far figure prominently in the 
life and thought of St. Augustine. Perhaps more than most, Augustine placed the problem 
of self-knowledge at the forefront of his search for understanding. In the remainder of 
this chapter, I would like to explore in further detail the content of this search, focusing in 
particular on where Augustine’s search for understanding his faith overlaps with his 
search for self-understanding. As stated earlier in the introduction to this thesis, 
Augustine himself does not present to his readers a unified “theory of the self,” and it is 
certainly not my intent in this chapter to construct one for him. What I do hope to 
articulate, however, is a clearer understanding of how Augustine construes personal 
identity and the various modalities which this interpretation takes. For convenience sake, 
I have divided the following analysis into three broad sections, which may be read 
respectively as corresponding to sections of Augustine’s writings on metaphysics, 
epistemology and theology: 1) The Soul’s Search for Knowledge, Truth and God, 2) 
Memory and the Interior Teacher, and 3) Human Nature and its Redemption. But before 
delving into the first of these topics, a word or two on Augustine’s method of inquiry will 
be in order. 
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Reflective Interiority and the ‘Homo Interior’  
 
I should begin here by underlining the fact that Augustine’s method of inquiry is 
precisely just that, a method. Augustine’s intense introspection as a method for 
understanding his faith, characterized by some scholars as a reflective, almost radical, 
interiority,65 is certainly not without textual support.66 But it would be a mistake to 
interpret such inwardness as indicative of a radical turn in western thought from 
conceptions of the individual as part of a larger order to, in fact, becoming this order. 
Augustine’s own employment of the language of inwardness, modeled on the language of 
the biblical tradition,67 serves a twofold purpose: 1) to establish a medium of 
communication through which he could come into contact with reflections of the Divine 
and 2) to facilitate the confession and narration of his life’s inner struggle.  
 As was recounted earlier in this chapter, Christian Doctrine construed man as 
having been created in the image of God. “Let us make humankind [Heb adam] in our 
image, according to our likeness,” God says in Genesis Book I, “and let him have 
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and 
over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the 
earth. So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them.”68 
On the subject of man’s self-knowledge and his relation to God, the Bible speaks 
unequivocally to the Christian pilgrim: God is to be found within, recognizable to us 
                                                 
65 Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, Ch. 7.  
66 Cf. Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will. Translated by Anna S. Benjamin, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill, Inc., 1964, Book II Chapter III, p. 40; Op. cit. Augustine. Confessions, Book VIII, p. 170; 
Augustine. De Trinitate. Translated by Edmund Hill, O.P. New York: New City Press, 1991, Book X 16.  
67 Cf.: Job 24:15 (‘the eye of the adulterer’); Proverbs 18:15 (‘and the ear of the wise seeks knowledge’); 
Ecclesiastes 2:15 (‘and I said to myself’); Matthew 5:27-28 (‘everyone who looks at a woman with lust has 
already committed adultery with her in his heart’). Op. cit. R.A. Markus (ed.). Augustine, p. 176. 
68 Op. cit. Genesis, Book I 26-27. The New Oxford Annotated Bible, p. 12. 
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through the Divine image that dwells within our souls. For Augustine, this truth touches 
upon the entire edifice of his search to comprehend the significance of his newly found 
faith. As he states in Book X of his Confessions, “I have learned to love you [God] late! 
You were within me, and I was in the world outside myself. I searched for you outside 
myself and, disfigured as I was, I fell upon the lovely things of your creation. You were 
within me, but I was not with you.”69 To seek the certainty of God is, as Charles Taylor 
puts it so well, to discover the intimacy of His presence within.70 For Augustine, this 
journey inward is thus not a “way of life,” that is to say, an end in itself, but a means to 
arrive at a deeper understanding of a Truth that lies within.  
 Compared with Plato, Augustine’s reflective interiority represents an interesting 
shift in epistemological resources. As we saw in chapter one, Plato’s experience of 
knowledge as that which is eternal, immutable and true led him to believe in the supra-
sensible reality of the Forms. These Forms were externally situated, that is, they existed 
beyond the immediate grasp of the human intellect, and were considered to be of a public 
and common domain. To accede to this higher realm was to rise beyond oneself, beyond 
the strictures of the body and that which is particular to an immaterial world ordered 
according to the first principle of the Good. To come into sensible contact with this 
highest Good is near impossible. Indeed, Plato describes its apprehension as a form of 
mystical vision, as a “seeing with the soul” that which could not be “seen” with the eye.71 
What is important to note for present purposes is that this journey for Plato begins with 
an awareness of an external order of knowledge. To experience the Good, and indeed its 
apprehension could be nothing but an experience, man was to focus first on the world 
                                                 
69 Op. cit. Augustine. Confessions, Book X 27, p. 231.  
70 Op. cit. Charles Taylor. Sources of the Self, p. 134.  
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which it nourished. Consider the following: “And when the eye of the soul is really 
buried in a sort of barbaric dog, dialectic gently pulls it out and leads it upwards, using 
the crafts we have described to help it and cooperate with it in turning the soul around.”72 
It is dialectic, an intellectual commerce with another soul, that facilitates our ascent, not 
introspection. When we move, we are moving “upwards,” as Plato states, “proceeding to 
the first principle itself, so as to be secure.”73  
 The contrast here with Augustine is significant, but it is important to note that this 
difference is ultimately one of method. The problem is this: given the difficulties 
involved when attempting to contemplate and ascend to the highest principle of reality, 
where must one turn to begin the journey? The question is an epistemological one 
because we are dealing with the question of knowledge from both the point of view of the 
subject (how am I to locate this highest reality) and from the point of reality itself, as that 
which is produced and made intelligible through its participation in the highest principle, 
whether this principle be God or the Form of the Good. We have already noted Plato’s 
answer to this question: to discover the Highest Good is to observe first the order 
(kosmos) which it confers upon the sensible world. Through the contemplation of this 
external order we are drawn upward to a higher reality, one that accounts for and sustains 
the existence of the sensible world. This higher reality is itself divided, and through its 
contemplation we are led invariably to a vision of the highest Good, as that which 
produces and makes intelligible all of reality. Augustine shares with Plato this intimate 
sense that reality is structured according to a rational and externally situated moral and 
spiritual order, and he describes the apprehension of this order in very similar terms: 
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“there is this good and that good,” Augustine states in Book VIII of De Trinitate, 
“remove the ‘this’ and the ‘that’ and see, if you can, the good itself. Thus you will see 
God.”74 Like Plato, Augustine describes the act of understanding this Highest Good 
through visual metaphors, as an act of “seeing” with the “eye of the soul” or with the 
“inner man.”75 The difference between the two thinkers lies in their choice of method for 
ascertaining this Good. For Augustine, a reflection of this Highest Good, namely God, is 
located within our souls. To accede to Him, we are therefore instructed to probe first the 
inner depths of our own souls before we may rise to seek Him in the external order which 
He has created.  
 Augustine’s use of the language of inwardness also serves another, arguably more 
important, purpose: to facilitate the confession and narration of his life’s inner struggle. 
In The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, Etienne Gilson claims that Augustine’s philosophy 
can be read almost entirely as a “metaphysic of conversion.”76 That is to say, Augustine’s 
efforts as a philosopher were almost entirely consumed with understanding a singular 
experience in his life, namely, the experience of his conversion. To understand this 
moment in his life naturally leads Augustine to ponder the reasons for his inability to 
convert to Christianity when he already knew with his mind what he ought to do: 
Why does this phenomenon occur? What causes it? The mind gives an order to the body 
and is at once obeyed, but when it gives an order to itself, it is resisted. The mind 
commands the hand to move and is so readily obeyed that the order can scarcely be 
distinguished from its execution. Yet the mind is mind and the hand is part of the body. 
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But when the mind commands the mind to make an act of will, these two are one in the 
same and yet the order is not obeyed.77 
The struggle depicted here refers to the struggle that Augustine faced between his 
intellect and his will. Unlike his Greek predecessors, Augustine was of the conviction 
that reason alone was insufficient to lead us to truth. Man may well know what path he 
ought to take, or the truths that he ought to follow, but without a conversion of the will, 
that is, a turning of the whole will toward God, the intellect is feeble and incapable of 
acting with a “full will” to give effect to the decisions that reason makes:  
But it [the mind] does not fully will to do this thing and therefore its orders are not fully 
given. It gives the order only in so far as it wills, and in so far as it does not will the order 
is not carried out…The reason, then, why the command is not obeyed is that it is not 
given with the full will. For if the will were full, it would not command itself to be full, 
since it would be so already. It is therefore no strange phenomenon partly to will to do 
something and partly to will not to do it. It is a disease of the mind, which does not 
wholly rise to the heights where it is lifted by the truth, because it is weighed down by 
habit.78  
Augustine goes on to speak of there being “two wills” within us, each with an unique 
ability of its own, but neither possessing the capacity to act in the name of the “whole 
will.” Augustine’s tale of conversion is thus a tale of his life’s inner struggle and conflict. 
To focus on Augustine’s external actions, those of his “outer man,”79 as he often refers to 
them, is to miss this intense and personal debate that lies at the heart of his experience in 
the Milanese garden, and indeed one that lies at the heart of most, if not all, of his later 
attempts to understand the meaning of his faith. Augustine’s use of the language of 
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inwardness enables him to depict this inner struggle with the utmost vividness and 
sensitivity. His literary outputs thus move from being a particular confession (confessio) 
of his own sins and love for God to a universal narrative of historical and religious 
significance.  
 
Augustine’s Search for Knowledge, Truth and God 
 
Augustine’s search for God stems not from a desire to prove His existence, but 
from a desire to understand what he already believes. In his Soliloquies, an earlier work 
dating from around the time of his baptism, Augustine states:  
Augustine: So, I have prayed to God. 
Reason: What, then, do you want to know? 
Augustine: All these things which I have prayed for.  
Reason: Sum them up briefly. 
Augustine: I want to know God and the soul. 
Reason: Nothing more.  
Augustine: Nothing at all.80 
It is significant that this passage takes the form of a prayer. Augustine is, in effect, 
praying to God in order to “know” His existence. By any standards of rationality, this act 
would appear to be an absurdity: Augustine is presupposing the existence of the Being he 
wishes to know exists. But for Augustine this act, far from a contradiction in terms, 
represents the essence of his mature philosophy, namely, of a faith seeking understanding 
(Fides quaerens intellectum). It is important when dealing with Augustine’s attempt to 
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understand God that one does not conflate this search with a desire to logically prove 
God’s existence; for as we shall later see, Augustine’s “proof” of God’s existence is far 
from logically sound. What I hope to draw out from Augustine’s deliberations on the 
subject is his method for understanding God and the resultant effects of this search on 
Augustine’s conception of the human person and its relation to the Divine.  
Augustine structures his treatment of God in three steps, progressing from the 
certainty of his own existence to standards of truth and knowledge that lie beyond the 
soul and finally to an equation of these truths with the ontological status of God. The 
coherence of the “proof” rests upon Augustine’s ability to demonstrate that there are 
truths that lie beyond the immediate certainty of his own existence, truths that regulate 
and define his own behavior and powers of judgment.  
 Augustine’s desire to “know” God begins with an attempt to establish the 
certainty of his own existence, an attempt which is remarkably similar at first glance to 
that of Descartes’ renowned cogito argument.81 Admitting that we are sometimes fooled 
by certain “imaginary and deceptive fantasies,”82 Augustine offers us a truth which he 
considers to be self-evident: “that I exist, that I know it, and that I am glad of it.”83 Of the 
veracity of this proposition, Augustine fears not the arguments of the skeptics:  
They [skeptics] say, ‘Suppose you are mistaken?’ I reply, ‘If I am mistaken, I exist.’ A 
non-existent being cannot be mistaken; therefore I must exist, if I am mistaken. Then 
                                                 
81 I will take, here, as my point of reference, Augustine’s argument as it is presented in City of God Book 
XI as opposed to his, albeit similar, argument in On Free Choice of the Will Book II Chapter III, in which 
he states to a close friend: “I will ask you first whether you exist. Are you, perhaps, afraid that you are 
being deceived by my questioning? But if you did not exist, it would be impossible for you to be deceived” 
(Op. cit. Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will, Book II Chapter III, p. 40). The phrasing of this passage is 
remarkably similar to that of Descartes, and would thus make for an interesting comparison. However, his 
argument is left undeveloped and is, on the whole, a rather unsophisticated version of that which is 
presented in fuller detail in Book XI of City of God.  
82 Op. cit. Augustine. City of God, Book XI 26, p. 459. Augustine is referring here to those deceptions that 
are associated with our memories and our bodily senses.  
83 Ibid. Book XI 26, p. 459 
                                                                                                       44
since my being mistaken proves that I exist, how can I be mistaken in thinking that I 
exist, seeing that my mistake establishes my existence? Since therefore I must exist in 
order to be mistaken, then even if I am mistaken, there can be no doubt that I am not 
mistaken in my knowledge that I exist. It follows that I am not mistaken in knowing that I 
know. For just as I know that I exist, I also know that I know. And when I am glad of 
those two facts, I can add the fact of that gladness to the things I know, as a fact of equal 
worth. For I am not mistaken about the fact of my gladness, since I am not mistaken 
about the things which I love. Even if they were illusory, it would still be a fact that I 
love the illusions.84  
Consider the truth which Augustine purports to have established, namely, the certainty of 
his own existence (“I exist”), thought (“I know it”) and emotion (“I am glad of it”; “I 
love”). This truth is about himself and his own state of being, not the external world, nor 
the metaphysical nature of God. To be sure, God remains the object of Augustine’s 
search, but the journey to Him beings within.  
 The affinities between Augustine and Descartes on this subject are more than 
apparent; but it would be a mistake to interpret Augustine’s argument in light of the 
motivations that guided Descartes to reach a similar conclusion (cogito ergo sum). 
Contrary to Descartes, the purpose of Augustine’s project was conceived primarily as a 
response to the skeptics—to those who would deny Augustine the possibility of 
establishing with certainty any form of knowledge whatsoever. Augustine is not 
attempting to establish an elementary truth about the certainty of his own existence, nor is 
he out to establish a new method with which he may hope to redirect and reconstruct our 
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previous conceptions of knowledge and truth.85 His purpose is to provide a sharp rebuff 
to his skeptical critics, as a closer examination of his argument will attest.  
 The validity of Augustine’s si fallor sum (“If I am mistaken, I exist”) argument 
hinges upon how one interprets his motivations. If one interprets Augustine’s motive in a 
Cartesian light, that is, as an attempt to establish the certainty of his own existence, the 
argument fails. If, however, one interprets the si fallor sum passage as a method for 
repudiating the skeptical claim regarding man’s ability to discern certain truths about 
reality, then the argument holds. Let’s take a closer look at the structure of the argument. 
Augustine’s principle claim may be rendered as follows: 1) “I know that I exist,” 2) 
“Unless I am mistaken, I exist,” 3) “Either I am mistaken or I exist,” 4) “If I am mistaken, 
I exist,” 5) “Either I exist or I exist,” 6) “I exist.”86 Step one corresponds to Augustine’s 
initial claim, namely, that he knows that he exists. In between step one and two there is 
an implied premise, which I shall refer to as one b), which is intended to take into 
account the skeptical claim regarding the possibility that he might be mistaken. To 
accommodate the skeptic, Augustine thus asserts step two: “Unless I am mistaken, I 
exist.”  Step three (“Either I am mistaken or I exist”) is a restatement of the facts, which 
allows Augustine, in step four, to isolate the subject portion of the statement (“Unless, I 
am mistaken”) from its predicate (“I exist”). Step four is thus the crucial statement of the 
argument, namely, that if Augustine is mistaken he must exist, for “a non-existent being 
cannot be mistaken.”87 In step five Augustine therefore proceeds to replace the subject of 
statement four (“If I am mistaken”) with (“I exist”). Statement five thus reads: “Either I 
exist or I exist,” which naturally leads Augustine to conclude that he exists.  
                                                 
85 For an interesting comparison see: René Descartes. Discourse on Method, 2.18-2.19, p. 120.   
86 I have adapted the basic structure of this rendition from: Gareth B. Matthews, “Si Fallor Sum,” p. 154.  
87 Op. cit. Augustine. City of God, Book XI 26, p. 460. 
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 The argument itself is logically flawed. As Gareth B. Matthews astutely points 
out, the argument yields the conclusion, “I exist,” but Augustine’s answer to the 
Academic skeptics is supposed to safeguard the premise “I know that I exist.”88 Taken as 
rhetorical attempt to establish a tautology with respect the certainty of his own existence, 
the argument thus fails, succumbing to the familiar logical fallacy of “begging the 
question.” However, if interpreted as a rhetorical trap to silence the skeptic, the argument 
holds. Let’s return to premises one and one b) expounded upon above. Premise one reads: 
“I know that I exist.” Implied premise one b) is initiated by the skeptic and may be 
presumed to take the following form: “But you have often been mistaken in the past. 
Therefore, you might be mistaken about whether you are…[my emphasis].”89 The claim 
is self-defeating. The skeptic has presupposed the very truth that he wishes to call into 
doubt, namely, Augustine’s existence!  
That Augustine’s argument in this passage is tailored specifically to his more 
skeptical audience is reinforced by his claim that he “knows” his own existence not 
through the certainty of argument but through the immediacy of the mind’s own 
knowledge of itself: “when it is said to the mind, ‘Know Yourself!’ it knows itself the 
moment it understands what is said: ‘yourself’; nor does it know itself for any reason 
other than that it is present to itself.”90 Thus we may conclude that Augustine’s original 
“argument” shares more in common with an article of faith, which presupposes no 
intellectual justification, than it does with Descartes’ cogito. What is at stake for 
Augustine is not, as was mentioned previously, the establishment of his own certainty of 
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presence but the ability of man to ascertain certain truths which are made available to the 
mind through its participation in the Divine Ideas.91  
In On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine builds from the aforesaid principles to 
note that the immediate and direct truths of his own existence are arranged in a hierarchy 
of values: to know and to love is better than to live,92 and to live is better than to merely 
exist.93 In a conversation with Evodius, a close friend, Augustine states:  
Augustine: So you now know what you said you did not know: not everything that lives 
knows that it lives, although everything that knows that it lives is necessarily alive. 
Evodius: I am in doubt no longer. Go on to the next point: I have now learned that it is 
one thing to be alive and quite another to know that one is alive.  
Augustine: Which of these two things do you think is more excellent? 
Evodius: Why, clearly, the knowledge of life [scientia vitae]. 
Augustine: Do you think that the knowledge of life is better than life itself? Or perhaps 
you understand that a certain higher and truer life consists in the knowledge of life, which 
no one can have except those who have understanding? For what is understanding except 
living more clearly and perfectly by the very light of the mind? Therefore, unless I am 
deceived, you have not set something else above life, but rather have set a better life 
above mere life.  
                                                 
91 At the end of Chapter 27 of Book XI Augustine states: “we have another sense, far more important than 
any bodily sense, the sense of the inner man, by which we apprehend what is just and what is unjust, the 
just by means of the ‘idea’ which is presented to the intellect, the unjust by the absence of it. The working 
of this sense has nothing to do with the mechanism of eye, ear, smell, taste or touch. It is through this sense 
that I am assured of my existence; and through this I love both existence and knowledge, and am sure that I 
love them” (Augustine. City of God, Book XI 27, p. 462).  
92 For Augustine’s argument regarding the certainty that he lives see: Augustine. De Trinitate, Book XV 
Chapter XII n.21. 
93 It is worth noting that this is also an analytic hierarchy of capacities, with the latter (existing and living) 
being incorporated into the former (knowing). As Augustine has Evodius state: “Because, while there are 
these things—to be, to live, and to understand—the stone is, and the beast lives, yet I think that the stone 
does not live, nor the beast understand. Furthermore, it is very certain that he who understands both is and 
lives. For this reason I do not hesitate to judge that in which all these three are present to be more perfect 
than that in which anyone is lacking.” Augustine: “We maintain, then, that the dead body lacks two of these 
three [does not live or understand]; the beast, one [does not understand]; and man, none” (Op. cit. 
Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will, Book II Chapter III, p. 40).      
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Evodius: You have understood and explained my view very well.94 
Augustine points out that when one speaks of a hierarchy among these goods one is, in 
truth, highlighting the qualitative difference between them. To desire “knowledge of life” 
(scientia vitae) does not entail a desire to abandon the principle of “life” itself; instead, 
the knowledge of life represents “a better life,” one that reaches its supreme fulfillment 
when reason exercises its mastery over the emotions. “When reason, whether mind 
(mens) or spirit (animus), rules the irrational emotions,” Augustine notes, “then there 
exists in man the very mastery which the law that we know to be eternal prescribes.”95 
Thus, at the pinnacle of Augustine’s hierarchy of values stands man’s capacity to reason, 
the essential ingredient for one to possess a true “knowledge of life.” 
 Thus far, the truths which Augustine purports to have established are truths that 
concern the state of his own existence, his own thought, feeling, and intellectual 
capacities, in short, truths linked to the immediacy of his own experience. These truths 
are arranged according to a hierarchy of values, and are presumed to be “well ordered” 
(ordinatus) when reason rules. At this point, one might pose the following question to 
Augustine: is it possible to know more than this? That is, can one demonstrate that there 
are truths, not just about ourselves, but about the world around us? Or is man’s reason the 
highest truth among all known goods of our personal experience? This question presents 
itself with the utmost urgency for Augustine, particularly given the dangers that the 
skeptical challenge poses for his ability to understand why it is rational to believe in the 
existence of God.  
                                                 
94 Ibid. Book I Chapter VII, p. 17   
95 Ibid. Book I Chapter VIII, p. 19  
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 Augustine meets this challenge in two ways, focusing first on the existence of 
mathematical truths (ratio et veritas numeri) and then on the existence of more practical 
truths, such as those truths concerning happiness and what is best, or better. Examples 
within Augustine’s work of the veracity of mathematical principles are quite common. 
Here is one of his more straightforward examples:  
Whatever I may experience with my bodily senses, such as this air and earth and 
whatever corporeal matter they contain, I cannot know how long it will endure. But seven 
and three are ten, not only now, but forever. There has never been a time when seven and 
three were not ten, nor will there ever be a time when they are not ten. Therefore, I have 
said that the truth of number is incorruptible and common to all who think.96  
Augustine claims that this is a truth that “all reasoning men see with their reason and 
mind, in common with all others.”97 This is, moreover, a truth that endures, irrespective 
of whether or not a man succeeds in or fails to comprehend it.  
 Augustine’s discussion of practical truths follows naturally from his 
understanding of the nature of mathematical truths. Recall in the passage quoted above 
that the “truth of number is incorruptible.” For Augustine, that which is incorruptible 
carries with it a certain moral import. As he states in a later passage from the same work, 
surely the “incorrupt is better than the corrupt, the eternal better than the temporal, the 
inviolable better than the violable.”98  Here we have a truth concerning that which is 
“better,” implying that in addition to mathematical truths man may also discern moral 
truths of an equal weight. As we shall see shortly, the existence of such truths bears 
significantly upon Augustine’s ontological conception of God.  
                                                 
96 Ibid. Book II Chapter VIII, p. 54   
97 Ibid. Book II Chapter VIII, p. 53 
98 Ibid. Book II Chapter X, p. 61 [my emphasis] 
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 But before we move on to Augustine’s ontological argument, it is important to 
draw out more explicitly the common nature of these truths that Augustine purports to 
have established. Three principles stand out immediately as defining characteristics of the 
truth: that it exists, that it is immutable and that it is common to all who may know it. 
“You will not deny,” Augustine states, “that immutable truth, comprising everything that 
is immutably true, exists; and you cannot say that immutable truth is yours, or mine, or 
anyone else’s. It is present and shows itself as a king of miraculously secret, yet public, 
light for all who see what is immutably true.”99 But more important than all three of these 
characteristics, at least for Augustine’s purposes, is truth’s superiority to the minds that 
may know it. As Augustine notes in a later passage, our minds do not make judgments 
about truth, but judge in accordance with truth.100 To make judgments about something, 
Augustine notes, is at once to assume that this thing is inferior; in which case, one may 
say not only what the thing in question is, but also how it ought to be. “But no one,” says 
Augustine, “makes judgments about the rules themselves.”101 Returning to the 
mathematical truth noted above, one may say that seven plus three are ten, but no one 
could possibly state that seven plus three ought to be ten. Augustine’s observation could 
also be applied with equal facility to practical truths, such as the inadmissibility of 
claiming that the beautiful or the good ought to be beautiful or good, for they already 
encompass, by their very nature, the qualities of beauty and goodness respectively.    
 It is at this stage of Augustine’s argument that we may come to understand how 
and why it is rational to believe in God. Recall what Augustine has demonstrated thus far: 
a) we may know certain truths; b) of these, the most immediate concern the truths of our 
                                                 
99 Ibid. Book II Chapter XII, p. 66 
100 Ibid. Book II Chapter XII, p. 67 
101 Ibid. Book II Chapter XII, p. 66 [my emphasis] 
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own experience, namely, that we exist, that we live and that we know; c) these truths are 
ordered in a hierarchy of values and capacities, with reason recognized as that which is 
highest and most noble in man; d) in addition to truths about ourselves, man may also 
discern quantitative and practical truths, such as truths about the status of mathematical 
knowledge and our happiness respectively; e) these latter truths, being of an eternal and 
immutable nature, are superior to our reason, that is, we make judgments according to 
these truths, not about them. If we examine these arguments carefully, Augustine notes, 
we shall notice that our definition of truth coheres with our common ontological 
understanding of God:  
Augustine: What if we should be able to find something which not only exists, but even 
is more excellent than our reason? Will you hesitate to say that, whatever it is, this is our 
God?  
Evodius: If I could find something better than what is best in my nature, I would not 
immediately say that this is God. I am not inclined to call God that to which my reason is 
inferior, but rather that to whom no one is superior.    
Augustine: Clearly. And God Himself has given your reason the power to think so 
devoutly and truly about Him. But, I ask you, if you find that there is nothing superior to 
our reason except what is eternal and immutable, will you hesitate to sat that this is 
God?...Reason itself is clearly proven to be mutable, now struggling to arrive at truth, 
now ceasing to struggle, sometimes reaching it and sometimes not… 
Evodius: I shall admit that this is God to which nothing is granted to be superior.102  
God, by definition, is “that to whom no one is superior.” Augustine has demonstrated that 
truth exists, that it is eternal, immutable, universal, and, most importantly, superior to us. 
It follows that, in so far as there is nothing superior to truth, God is truth and must 
therefore necessarily exist. As Augustine puts it somewhat succinctly, “if there is 
                                                 
102 Ibid. Book II Chapter VI, p. 49 [my emphasis] 
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something more excellent than truth, this is God. If there is not, then truth itself is 
God.”103  
 One striking aspect of Augustine’s ontological argument for the existence of God 
is its similarity to that of St. Anselm’s. We shall be taking a closer look at Anselm’s 
argument in the following chapter. What I would like to concentrate briefly on here, 
however, is the affinities between the two uses of the argument, with a particular focus on 
where and how their definitions of God diverge.  
 The lynchpin of Anselm’s ontological argument is as follows: “we certainly 
believe that you [God] are something than which nothing greater can be conceived [te 
esse aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari posit].”104 Above we noted that Augustine’s 
definition of God treated, in particular, His superiority to the minds that may know Him: 
“God [is]…that to whom no one is superior.”105 This is, however, only one among many 
definitions that Augustine has for God. More frequently, what Augustine chooses to 
emphasize is God’s supreme goodness and His incorruptibility. In Book VII of his 
Confessions Augustine states:  
 Now that I had realized that what is incorruptible is better than that which is not, I took 
this as the basis for further research and acknowledged that, whatever your nature might 
be, you must be incorruptible. For no soul has ever been, or will ever be, able to conceive 
of anything better [melius] than you, who are the supreme, the perfect Good. And since, 
as I now believed, there could be no possible doubt that the incorruptible is better than 
the corruptible, it followed that you must be incorruptible.106  
                                                 
103 Ibid. Book II Chapter XV, p. 71 
104 Anselm. Proslogion.  Ed. Charlesworth, M.J. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, 
Chapter II, p. 4. 
105 Op. cit. Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will, Book II Chapter VI, p. 49. 
106 Op. cit. Augustine. Confessions, Book VII 4, p. 137. See also: Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, Book 
X 7.7 [my emphasis]. 
                                                                                                       53
Note here what Augustine is emphasizing; it is not God’s existence that invites our 
speculation but His incorruptibility, His goodness. As John F. Callahan argues in his 
excellent little book Augustine and the Greek Philosophers, “it [Augustine’s ontological 
argument] is an argument regarding a being than which a better is not thought, not a 
being than which a better cannot be thought, and it is based on the universal consent to 
such a being rather than on the content of the conception itself…”107 By couching his 
definition of God in terms of qualitative principles, such as His Goodness or the fact that 
He is “better than you,” Augustine does not introduce the epistemic separation that one 
finds in Anselm’s argument.108 Indeed, the very quality of God that is in question for 
Augustine is not, properly speaking, a question; for no one doubts the incorruptibility of 
God. The real question for Augustine is not the nature of God or, for that matter, His 
existence, but whether or not we may understand our faith in Him.109  
 In The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, Etienne Gilson remarks that most medieval 
speculations on the nature of God move along a specific and identifiable trajectory; “not, 
that is, from God to man, but from man to God.”110 Although stated within a general 
context, Gilson’s observation carries with it a particular relevancy for understanding the 
thought of Augustine. Recall that in his attempt to understand God, Augustine begins by 
establishing a truth about his own existence, thought and feeling. These truths, in addition 
to the truths of mathematics and practical knowledge, are immutable and eternal, and are 
                                                 
107 John F Callahan. Augustine and the Greek Philosophers. The Saint Augustine Lecture. Villanova 
University Press, 1967, p.3.  
108 I refer here to the separation that Anselm’s argument engenders between the “knower” (Christian 
pilgrim) and the “object to be known” (God). This will be explored in more detail in the following chapter.  
109 It is interesting to note that Augustine himself refers little weight to the rational coherence of his 
“proof”: “this indisputable fact [that God’s exists] we maintain, I think, not only by faith, but also by a sure 
though somewhat tenuous form of reasoning, which is sufficient for the immediate question [my emphasis]” 
Op. cit. Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will, Book II Chapter XV, p. 71.  
110 Op. cit. Etienne Gilson. The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, p. 213.  
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known to Augustine not by any bodily sense but by an inner light, which irradiates the 
truth within our souls.111 As such, when reason turns within to ascertain truths regarding 
its own existence, it is at once brought into contact with a higher reality, one that 
regulates and defines its own powers of judgment.112 As Augustine states in Book II of 
On Free Choice of the Will, “reason itself is clearly proven to be mutable, now struggling 
to arrive at truth, now ceasing to struggle, sometimes reaching it and sometimes not.”113  
Augustine thus presents a portrait of the human soul that is, by its nature, a knower and a 
lover; but in knowing, the soul is made aware of its dependency upon something greater, 
something which is common to all but necessarily found by turning within.114  
 
 Memory and the Interior Teacher  
 
This notion of man’s dependency upon something greater, particularly as it relates 
to man as “knower,” is made even clearer in Augustine’s writings on memory and the 
interior teacher. Here, the central question is not specifically what man knows, but how 
he knows. That is to say, what accounts for man’s ability to recognize the truth when he 
sees it? Is truth ascertained by way of the senses? Or is there something deeper which 
accounts for our abilities to possess and lay claims to knowledge? Augustine’s answer is 
                                                 
111 See: Augustine. City of God, Book XI Chapter XXVII, p. 462. Contra Descartes, Augustine’s si fallor 
sum passage was not born of a motivation to establish an elementary truth about the certainty of his own 
existence. The argument was conceived primarily as a response to the Academics, and Augustine more than 
willingly admits that the truths which he has ostensibly derived from the si fallor sum argument have their 
true origins in the immediacy of man’s “inner sense”—that which is illuminated by the light of the Divine 
Ideas (see: Op. cit. Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will, Book II Chapter VIII, p. 54).  
112 Op. cit. Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will, Book II Chapter VI, p. 49: “…reason discerns that it is 
inferior and through its own power discerns something eternal and immutable…[which] is its God.”  
113 Ibid. Book II Chapter VI, p. 49 [my emphasis] 
114 “I have learned to love you late,” Augustine says to God, “You were within me, and I was in the world 
outside myself. I searched for you outside myself and, disfigured as I was, I fell upon the lovely things of 
your creation. You were within me, but I was not with you” (Op. cit. Augustine. Confessions, Book X 
Chapter 27, p. 231). See also: Augustine. De vera religione, 39.72. 
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that there is indeed a deeper explanation for our abilities to “know,” and that these 
abilities are linked not to our bodily senses nor to our memories but to an “inner light” 
that dwells within.   
As was discussed earlier in Chapter one, Plato faced a similar problem as regards 
man’s ability to recognize and assimilate knowledge. The problem was particularly acute 
with regard to man’s knowledge of “intellectual truths” (intelligibilia), as Augustine will 
later refer to them. For such concepts as Perfect Justice, Beauty and the Equal Itself are 
not made available to our minds via the sense organs. They are perfect, indivisible and 
universal and must therefore exist in a realm beyond that which is changing, temporal 
and imperfect. Plato resolves this epistemological crisis by positing a “theory of 
reminiscence,” whereby the truths of the intellectual world, such as that of Perfect Justice 
and Equality, are assumed to be forever present in the soul in the form of dim, but very 
real reflections of a higher reality. Our coming to “know” these truths thus becomes an 
exercise in remembrance, in our ability to recollect, based on the soul’s previous 
existence, truths with which we were once intimately familiar. As Plato argues in 
Timaeus, “We should redirect the revolutions in our heads that were thrown off course at 
our birth, by coming to learn the harmonies and revolutions of the universe; and so bring 
into conformity with its objects the faculty of our understanding, as it was in its original 
conditions.”115  
Augustine’s solution to this problem is, in some respects, remarkably similar to 
that of Plato. For one thing, both describe the apprehension of true knowledge as a form 
                                                 
115 Plato. Timaeus, 90c-d. Zeyl translation, quoted in Johansen 2004, p. 1, n. 2. Quoted in Robert E. Proctor. 
“Cosmos: The Beauty Resulting from Order,” p. 5 [my emphasis]. 
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of intellectual illumination, one that follows from a direct acquaintance with the 
intelligible object in question. As Augustine argues in Book I of his Soliloquies:  
For the soul’s powers of perception are as it were the eyes of the mind [nam mentis quasi 
sui sunt oculi sensus animae]. The most certain truths which are arrived at by the sciences 
are like those objects which are illuminated by the sun with the result that they can be 
seen, such as the earth and all things on the earth. Now it is God Himself who 
illuminates, and I myself, the Reason, am to minds what the sight is to eyes.116  
In Book VI of the Republic, Plato states that the Form of the Good is the “cause of all 
things right and beautiful, giving birth to light and the lord of light in the visible world 
and originating truth and reason in the intelligible world.”117 Augustine would also agree 
with Plato that no one can, in the strictest sense, “teach,” or be “taught,” anything. “When 
I am stating truths,” Augustine claims, “I don’t even teach the person who is looking 
upon these truths. He is taught not by my words but by the things themselves made 
manifest within when God discloses them.”118 The similarities between the two thinkers 
in this regard are not coincidental. Indeed, Plato’s views on epistemology, particularly as 
they were read through the Neo-platonist tradition, had a considerable and explicit 
influence on Augustine’s thought; but this influence was not unqualified, and when and 
where Platonic doctrine contravened that of the Holy Scripture, Augustine was not 
adverse to transforming—and sometimes discrediting—the wisdom of the ancients.  
This tendency in Augustine’s thought can be seen quite clearly in the case of his 
more mature views on memory and how one may account for the soul’s ability to acquire 
and sustain knowledge. Unable to reconcile Plato’s doctrine of the soul’s preexistence 
                                                 
116 Op. cit. Augustine. Soliloquies, Book I, p. 41.  
117 Op. cit. Plato. Republic, 517c. 
118 Augustine. De Magistro. Translated by Peter King. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 
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with the Christian Doctrine of creation, Augustine offers us a novel and fascinating view 
about how the soul learns—one that combines the thought of Plato and the Neo-platonic 
tradition with the thought of the Manichean religion and the Christian belief in Christ 
(Word or Logos) as the “true light that enlightens everyone coming into the world.”119 In 
the remainder of this section, I would like to explore in further detail Augustine’s theory 
of knowledge, focusing in particular on where and how his epistemology reinforces the 
notion of man’s dependency upon God.  
 Let us return to what Augustine has to say about teaching. Recall that Augustine 
does not believe that one can, in the strictest sense, be “taught” anything. This claim is 
based on two factors: a) it is quite possible that we may be told lies, in addition to truths 
and b) words do not themselves mean anything; they are signs and as such they merely 
represent, or signify, reality. “I’m trying to persuade you,” Augustine argues in Book X 
of De Magistro (The Teacher), “…that we do not learn anything by these signs called 
words. As I have stated, we learn the meaning of the word—that is, the signification 
hidden in the sound—once the thing signified is itself known, rather than our perceiving 
it by means of such signification.”120 Words thus carry, at least at minimum, a certain 
value for Augustine for they “remind us to look for things,”121 meaning that our search to 
comprehend the meaning of words is at once a search to come into direct contact with the 
realities they represent. True knowledge therefore entails both a knowledge of the 
                                                 
119John, 1.9. The New Oxford Annotated Bible. Third Edition. Editor: Michael D. Coogan. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991, p. 148. See also Augustine’s reference to John in: Op. cit. Augustine. Confessions, 
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meaning of words—a contextual web, so to speak, within which we may process sensible 
inputs—and an experience of the realities that these words signify.  
 Such a definition of true knowledge raises interesting epistemological questions 
regarding how man may come to know certain truths, particularly with respect to man’s 
ability to ascertain intellectual truths, such as the truths of wisdom, justice and equality. 
Consider the implications of Augustine’s theory of signs for our ability to learn by way of 
instruction. According to the theory, our ability to learn from others is severely limited, 
for human instruction will, at best, merely acquaint us with the meanings of words. To 
gain a true sense of what these words actually signify, we would have to be acquainted 
with the realities they represent, which would suggest that true knowledge must be 
formed via sensible experience. But even here our own abilities are inadequate, for 
experience alone, without the assistance of language to structure one’s reception of these 
inputs, merely accords us a crude understanding of reality.    
 Suppose it is granted that we possess a basic understanding of the world of 
experience and that this understanding is attended by a sufficient lexicon with which we 
may express ourselves. Even here, however, one senses a hesitancy in Augustine’s 
thought to accord man an independent capacity to formulate true knowledge. In Book XII 
of De Magistro Augustine states:  
When a question arises, not about what we sense before us, but about what we have 
sensed in the past, then we do not speak of the things themselves, but of images 
impressed from them on the mind and committed to memory. Indeed I do not know how 
we come to call (the things we speak of) real, since what we look at are counterfeits, 
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unless it is because we explain, not that we see and sense them but that we have seen and 
have sensed them.122 
When we speak of sensible things, barring our being located in their immediate presence, 
we are “looking at” the impressions that these sensible objects have left on our minds; in 
a word, we are considering only their images—or “counterfeits,” as Augustine refers to 
them. Our memories thus do not represent an independent source of knowledge but serve, 
instead, as repositories for the sensory-based objects that we have experienced.  
But how, then, do we learn? Sense experience alone seems to be insufficient, and 
our memories grant us only an approximation of the truth. Augustine’s solution to this 
conundrum invokes the power of the Interior Teacher, Christ, who dwells in the “inner 
man” and provides the rational soul with the wisdom and certainty that it so desires:  
Regarding each of the things we understand, however, we don’t consult a speaker who 
makes sounds outside us, but the Truth that presides within over the mind itself, though 
perhaps words prompt us to consult Him. What is more, He Who is consulted, He Who is 
said to dwell in the inner man, does teach: Christ—that is, the unchangeable power and 
everlasting wisdom of God, which every rational soul does consult, but is disclosed to 
anyone, to the extent that he can apprehend it, according to his good or evil will.123  
It is Christ, the Wisdom of God, who ensures the veracity of our judgments and enables 
us to possess true knowledge. To consider whether or not a proposition is true Augustine 
enjoins us to look deep within ourselves; if the proposition is true it will be illuminated 
by the “inner light” of Christ. Note that the wisdom that the Interior Teacher provides is 
common to all who choose to consult it, but only insofar as man is capable of 
apprehending it “according to his good or evil will.” It is the will then, and not the 
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intellect, that determines the extent of one’s knowledge; and it is the will, as we shall see 
in the following section, that relies most upon the grace of God for its restoration.  
 
Human Nature and its Redemption 
 
A pivotal component of Augustine’s conception of the human person centers on 
man’s dependency upon something greater than himself. Thus far, we have considered 
this notion of dependency from an epistemological point of view. In the first section, this 
dependency was identified as one in which reason, in turning inward to find God, was 
made aware of truths that exceeded its own powers of discernment. In section two, this 
notion of dependency was reinforced by an examination of Augustine’s views on how we 
learn. Here, it was discovered that man’s very ability to know, to possess a certain 
knowledge of intellectual and sensible truths, depended upon a consultation with the 
interior light of Christ. In the following section, I would like to continue with this theme 
of dependency, but from a more theological point of view; that is, I would like to focus 
on the soul as not only dependent upon God for knowledge but as inherently broken and 
in need of God’s grace to deliver itself from the weights of sin, pride and lust.   
 In his Confessions, and to a lesser degree in such works as On Christian Doctrine, 
City of God and On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine spends a considerable amount of 
time trying to understand the complexities of human nature. On the one hand, the Bible 
states that man is an image of God; he is created by God and is therefore a being with 
inherent worth and dignity. And yet, despite such noble origins, man is plagued by a 
prevailing sense of misery, insecurity and unhappiness. The Bible explains this 
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incongruence with the concept of original sin: as descendents of Adam and Eve, we all 
bear the mark of their original sinful transgression. We are best by pride, lust, ignorance, 
and concupiscence, and are incapable of “going back” to recover our lost innocence. 
Although Augustine takes this account of original sin quite seriously, this does not deter 
him from trying to understand why it is that we sin, the nature of sin, and how sin is 
possible in a world created by a good God.   
 In Book I of his Confessions, Augustine paints a revealing portrait of human 
nature at its infancy. Questioning the conventional wisdom of regarding infants as 
innocent and uncorrupted, Augustine states:  
It can hardly be right for a child, even at that age, to cry for everything, including things 
which would harm him; to work himself into a tantrum against people older than himself 
and not required to obey him; and to try his best to strike and hurt others who know better 
than he does, including his own parents, when they do not give into him, and refuse to 
pander to whims which would only do him harm. This shows that, if babies are innocent, 
it is not for lack of will to do harm, but for lack of strength.124 
Here, as in a variety of other passages from the same work,125 Augustine speaks of sin as 
a condition of the soul, not of the body. That is to say, the nature of sin flows not from 
one’s external actions but from an inner disposition, in short, from a motivation for 
satisfying one’s own needs and wants. Augustine refers to these motivations that 
collectively determine a person’s actions as “loves.”126 When we are motivated to do 
something, Augustine claims that we are in fact moved by a love to perform this action. 
We imagine that this action or object will make us happy, and we are therefore willing to 
do whatever is in our power to rest securely with the object of our desire.  
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Not unlike Plato, then, Augustine believes that all men are “lovers”: we are all 
moved by a love of the Good, and we all wish to possess this Good so that we may secure 
our happiness. Augustine would also agree with Plato that this love is not involuntary; for 
in addition to pure desire we are also creatures of reason, endowed with wills that may 
regulate the forces of love within us. It is therefore our moral responsibility to love 
appropriately or, as Augustine terms it, to exhibit a “rightly ordered love.” As he states in 
Book XV of City of God: 
Now physical beauty, to be sure, is a good created by God, but it is a temporal, carnal 
good, very low in the scale of goods; and if it is loved in preference to God, the eternal, 
internal and sempiternal Good, that love is as wrong as the miser’s love of gold, with the 
abandonment of justice, though the fault is in the man, not in the gold.127 
In addition to signaling out man’s moral responsibility to exhibit a rightly ordered love, 
Augustine introduces the idea of there being a metaphysical “scale of goods,” each 
marked by varying degrees of worth, or value. The idea that reality is structured 
according to a hierarchy of value is central to Augustine’s thought. We have already seen 
how this hierarchy informs Augustine’s search for God and Truth; we may now also see 
that this notion of an ordered reality has a direct application for Augustine’s moral 
philosophy.  
 According to the Neo-platonic tradition that Augustine inherits, reality is 
structured according to a Great Chain of Being. At the apex of this hierarchical order 
stands God, a Christian rendition of Plotinus’ “One.”128 Through Christ (logos), who both 
                                                 
127 Op. cit. Augustine. City of God, Book XV Chapter 22, p. 636.  
128 This notion of creation is specifically Christian. According to Christian doctrine, the world was created 
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“is God” and is “with God,”129 God created the world that we see around us. Everything, 
from inorganic matter and plants to animals, man and the angels, has its being in God and 
is therefore entirely dependent upon Him for its existence. This hierarchy of being is also 
one of value, with a thing’s being directly proportional to its degree of goodness. 
Accordingly, this order requires man to direct his love with equanimity: man must know 
his place within this order and must take care not to confer upon lower goods a love that 
is incommensurate with their intrinsic value. In On Christian Doctrine, Augustine offers 
us the following advice:  
Now he is a man of just and holy life who forms an unprejudiced estimate of things, and 
keeps his affections also under strict control, so that he neither loves what he ought not to 
love, nor fails to love what he ought to love, nor loves that equally which ought to be 
loved either less or more, nor loves less or more which ought to be loved equally. No 
sinner is to be loved as a sinner; and every man is to be loved as a man for God's sake; 
but God is to be loved for His own sake. And if God is to be loved more than any man, 
each man ought to love God more than himself.130  
We may now better understand what Augustine means when he enjoins us to exhibit a 
“rightly ordered love.” For if our loves were correctly ordered, they would not cease to 
love some objects in favor of others but would perfectly reflect the hierarchy of value 
inherent within God’s created order. To love “rightly” is to love God first, followed by a 
love for objects in accordance with their inherent worth and being. Those who are 
considered virtuous are thus those who exhibit a rightly ordered love. By contrast, sin and 
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vice are associated with disordered love, with a love that accords lower objects—such as 
money or pleasure—a value greater than their intrinsic worth.131 
Sin, then, is a property of existence for which we are held responsible. God 
created man and in so doing He created him free so that he may choose to live rightly. 
Recall that Augustine holds us morally responsible for our loves. It is we who decide 
what to love and in what proportion; God does not make these decisions for us. “When an 
evil choice happens in any being,” Augustine states, “then what happens is dependent on 
the will of that being; the failure is voluntary, not necessary, and the punishment that 
follows is just.”132 A corollary to this last point is that sin is more than just mere 
ignorance. To be sure, there is an ignorance associated with sin but it is a willful 
ignorance that marks our existence.133 Recall what Augustine has to say about Christ in 
De Magistro:  
He Who is consulted, He Who is said to dwell in the inner man, does teach: Christ—that 
is, the unchangeable power and everlasting wisdom of God, which every rational soul 
does consult, but is disclosed to anyone, to the extent that he can apprehend it, according 
to his good or evil will.134  
                                                 
131 Speaking of such lower goods Augustine states, “Let my soul praise you for these things, O God, 
Creator of them all; but the love of them, which we feel, through the senses of the body, must not be like 
glue to bind my soul to them. For they continue on the course that is set for them and leads to their end, and 
if the soul loves them and wishes to be with them and finds its rest in them, it is torn by desires that can 
destroy it” (Op. cit. Augustine. Confessions, Book IV Chapter 10).  
132 Op. cit. Augustine. City of God, Book XII Chapter 8, p. 480.  
133 This notion of willful ignorance stands in contrast to the Platonic notion that all wrongdoing is the result 
of ignorance and “virtue is knowledge”—that is, all that is necessary for the soul to live virtuously, 
according to Plato and Socrates, is for it to be re-directed by way of education toward the light of the Good. 
Augustine is arguing that education is simply not enough. In Christ, the light of Wisdom has been revealed 
to man; and yet, despite this selfless sacrifice, man remains impervious to His message. We are willfully 
ignorant and are therefore in need of something much greater than education to rescue us from our earthly 
predicament.  
134 Op. cit. Augustine. De Magistro, 11.38 [my emphasis]. 
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Since the time of Christ, we have all been enlightened as to the power and everlasting 
wisdom of God. This knowledge is “disclosed to anyone” but available only insofar as 
man is capable of receiving because of his good or evil will.  
It is clear to Augustine that man has grossly mishandled his free will. Instead of 
focusing on that which is eternal, permanent and true we have chosen to focus on goods 
of a lower order. We are concerned not with the “common good” but with our own 
private well-being. As Augustine states in On Free Choice of the Will:  
The will…commits sin when it turns away from immutable and common goods, toward 
its private good, either something external to itself or lower than itself. It turns to its own 
private good when it desires to be its own master; it turns to external goods when it 
busies itself with the private affairs of others or with whatever is none of its concern; it 
turns to goods lower than itself when it loves the pleasures of the body. Thus a man 
becomes proud, meddlesome, and lustful; he is caught up in another life which, when 
compared to the higher one, is death.135  
In turning away from God man becomes “proud, meddlesome, and lustful.” We have 
attached a disproportionate amount of value to goods of a lower order, while at the same 
time choosing to disregard the more enduring fruits of higher goods such as peace, love 
and God. But in turning away from God, we have also allowed our pride to subsume our 
categories of will and judgment. In City of God, Augustine remarks that man’s pride is 
the “original evil,” whereby man “regards himself as his own light, and turns away from 
that light which would make man himself a light if he would set his heart on it.”136 For in 
seeking to be “self-sufficient,” we reveal our disdain for the order that God has created. 
Instead of recognizing our proper place in the Great Chain of Being as “some little part of 
                                                 
135 Op. cit. Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will, Book II Chapter XIX, p. 82.  
136 Op. cit. Augustine. City of God, Book XIV Chapter 13, p. 573. 
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the perfect,”137 we have tried to elevate ourselves to the status of becoming “the perfect.” 
We have sought, in the words of Augustine, to make ourselves the “supreme and real” 
ground of our being.138  
Augustine’s portrait of human nature leaves us in a radically impotent and 
insufficient state. We are perverse and lustful creatures, driven by the insatiable dictates 
of our earthly needs and desires. We seek in goods of a lower order a happiness that can 
only be found in God. These desires shackle to soul, binding it by necessity to a world 
that is founded upon self-love and contempt for God.139 As Augustine recounts from his 
own life, “…my will was perverse and lust had grown from it, and when I gave in to lust 
habit was born, and when I did not resist the habit it became a necessity.”140 These 
desires, as Augustine notes, form a chain that links pride to lust, habit to necessity.141 
Given the perversity of the human will, man is incapable of breaking this chain on his 
own. What is needed is thus not a re-direction of the soul, as Plato advocates, but a 
radical re-construction of the will made possible by the grace of God.  
It is important to emphasize that the grace of God is, in every sense, a gift of 
grace: we neither merit the salvation that God has accorded us, nor would this salvation 
be possible without the work of Christ. As Augustine states somewhat paradoxically in 
Book X of his Confessions, “Give me the grace to do as you [God] command, and 
                                                 
137 Marcus Tullius Cicero. On the Nature of the Gods, Book II 14. 37. Quoted in: Op. cit. Robert E. Proctor. 
Defining the Humanities, p. 17.   
138 Op. cit. Augustine. City of God, Book XIV Chapter 13, p. 573.  
139 Cf. Ibid. Book XIV Chapter 28, p. 593 
140 Op. cit. Augustine. Confessions, Book VIII Chapter 5, p. 164.  
141 Recall our earlier discussion of the role of the intellect and the will in Augustine’s thought. In 
Augustine’s view, the intellect is insufficient to bring about a total “turning of the will” toward God. This is 
illustrated in Book VII of his Confessions in which Augustine laments his inability to turn to God (a 
property of the will) despite the fact that he knew with his mind what he ought to do.  
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command me to do what you will!”142 On the one hand, our salvation is a choice that we 
make; and in this sense, we are free to decide for ourselves what is right and how we will 
live. But Augustine also points out that our wills are incapable of making this decision on 
their own: we are inherently broken and love imperfectly, and yet somehow we are 
connected by that which loves us. Once again, we see in Augustine’s thought a hesitancy 
to ascribe to man the independence that he so desires. We are creatures of God and as 
such we are wholly reliant upon His Being and Goodness for our salvation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142 Op. cit. Augustine. Confessions, Book X Chapter 29, p. 233.  
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Chapter III: St. Anselm and the Reorientation of Ancient Categories of 
Thought 
 
Faith, Reason and the New Scholasticism  
 
 St. Anselm (1033-1109) marks a turning point in the history of Western 
philosophy. Rebelling against the Christian anti-intellectualism of his time,143 Anselm’s 
work represents a bold and creative effort to synthesize the theology of St. Augustine 
with the new scholasticism of the eleventh and twelfth centuries.144 Like Augustine, 
Anselm believed that reason and faith complimented one another in the search to 
understand God and the soul; the difference between the two thinkers, and consequently 
what places Anselm so firmly in the scholastic tradition, lies in their respective beliefs 
about the place of reason in theological discourse. Anselm held that a rational analysis of 
one’s faith was essential for the development, understanding and defense of one’s beliefs. 
This is not to say that Anselm rejected those articles of faith that he himself was unable to 
prove: if the limits of reason were reached, faith would abide. The important point, as 
Copleston rightly notes, is that Anselm was not prepared to “set limits in advance.”145   
 It is within this context that one may come to appreciate the novelty of Anselm’s 
ontological argument for the existence of God. Faith has provided Anselm, in a manner 
                                                 
143 Cf. the works of St. Peter Damian, a prominent figure in the Gregorian reform movement of the 11th and 
12th centuries. St. Damian was an outspoken opponent of the use of dialectic in philosophical and 
theological discourse, and was often highly critical of those who attempted to substantiate the truths of 
Christian Revelation through the use of reason.  
144 This “new scholasticism” of the late middle ages functioned in opposition to modes of Christian anti-
intellectualism that had prevailed in Europe for centuries. The movement, practiced by Christian 
philosophers and theologians in the medieval university, was concerned primarily with integrating the logic 
and metaphysics of Aristotle with the wisdom of the Sacred Scriptures.  
145 Op. cit. Frederick C. Copleston. History of Medieval Philosophy, p. 72.  
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of speaking, with the evidence or “conclusion” of God’s existence; but Anselm’s desire is 
to understand this faith in a way that gives primacy to human reason and logical 
argument. In his Monologion, or Soliloquy, as it is often translated, Anselm attempted to 
substantiate the truths of Christian doctrine, particularly truths relating to the nature and 
existence of God, without recourse to faith. As he states in the preface: “Now, whatever I 
have stated in this treatise I have stated in the role of one who by reflection alone (sola 
cogitatione) investigates, and disputes with himself about, points which he had 
previously not considered.”146 Although Anselm found nothing in the treatise that was 
incompatible with the writings of the Catholic Fathers, he soon began to wonder whether 
the “chain of many arguments” presented in the Monolgion might be reduced to a single 
argument that would “constitute an independent proof and would suffice by itself to 
demonstrate that (1) God truly [really] exists, that (2) He is the Supreme Good, needing 
no one else yet needed by all else in order to exist and to fare well, and that (3) He is 
whatever else we believe about the Divine Substance.”147 The content and nature of this 
“single argument” we will soon explore, but for now it is important to observe the tone of 
Anselm’s inquiry, the faith that he places not only in his belief but more importantly, in 
his reason.  
 
Anselm’s Ontological Proof for the Existence of God 
 
Let’s take a closer look at Anselm’s argument. By way of introduction, perhaps 
the most striking aspect of his text is its indebtedness to St. Augustine. In Chapter one of 
                                                 
146 Anselm. Monolgion. Edited and Translated by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson. New York: The 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1975, p. 4 (Preface). 
147 Anselm. Proslogion. Ibid. p. 89 (Preface)  
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his Proslogion—originally entitled Faith Seeking Understanding,148 Anselm states his 
reason for undertaking the task of proving God’s existence in familiar terms: “I yearn to 
understand some measure of Your truth, which my heart believes and loves. For I do not 
seek to understand in order to believe but I believe in order to understand.”149 As was the 
case with Augustine, Anselm’s ostensible aim is not to “prove” God’s existence, but to 
understand His existence in a way that is complimentary to his faith. It is also worth 
nothing that Anselm’s search to understand God begins not in the world of experience, 
but in an appeal to God as a teacher that lies within. Echoing the words of Augustine in 
De Magistro, Anselm prays, “Teach me to seek You [God], and reveal Yourself to me as 
I seek; for unless You instruct me I cannot seek You, and unless You reveal Yourself I 
cannot find You.”150  
 The argument that Anselm believes to have learned from the Interior Teacher 
begins with a deceptively simple proposition about the idea of God: God is that than 
which nothing greater can be conceived.151 There are a number of important points to 
draw out of this proposition before moving on to a more formal analysis of Anselm’s 
argument. First, note that Anselm is not merely stating that God is the greatest of all 
possible beings—an argument closer to that of Augustine; he is arguing for a conception 
of God that is unaffected and unbound by human faith or understanding. Second, 
Anselm’s argument makes no presuppositions regarding the nature of God. Anselm is 
concerned only with the “content of the conception itself”152 and as such, qualitative 
principles, such as God’s incorruptibility, do not factor into his broader argument. Third, 
                                                 
148 Ibid. p. 90 (Preface) 
149 Ibid. p. 93 (Chapter I)  
150 Ibid. p. 93 (Chapter I)  
151 Ibid. p. 93 (Chapter II) “aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit" 
152 Op. cit. John F. Callahan. Augustine and the Greek Philosophers, p. 3.  
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the essential question for Anselm is therefore not the goodness of God, as it was for 
Augustine, but the existence of God. As he states in the Preface to the Proslogion: “I 
began to ask myself whether perhaps a single argument could be found which would 
constitute an independent proof and would suffice by itself to demonstrate that God truly 
exists.”153 Anselm may be guided by a desire to understand what he believes, but the 
thrust of his argument aims at a proof of God’s existence that stands independently of his 
Christian faith.   
 Anselm’s method for developing this proof proceeds according to the common 
rhetorical form of the scholastic disputations—enlisting a high-minded interlocutor to 
further advance one’s argument. In the Proslogion, this interlocutor is “the fool” who, 
according to Psalm 14:1, “has said in his heart that God does not exist.”154  Anselm’s 
response to this “fool” is twofold.155 Perhaps the fool comprehends only the word 
signifying what is conceived, namely, the word “God,” in which case the fool is merely 
ignorant of the terms he utters. To convince the fool of his mistake, one would only need 
to clarify the concepts that underlie the terms “God” and “does not exist” for the fool to 
realize the error of his ways. If, on the other hand, the fool is able to understand what he 
is saying, that is, if he asserts that “God does not exist” and knows full well that God is 
that than which nothing greater can be conceived, then Anselm claims he is engaging in 
a logical contradiction. To understand why this is so, let us take a closer look at the logic 
that underpins Anselm’s argument. We can begin with a question: what about Anselm’s 
ontological proof entails God’s existence? Take a painting for example.156 If one is to 
                                                 
153 Op. cit. Anselm. Proslogion, p. 89 (Preface) [my emphasis]. 
154 Ibid. p. 93 (Chapter II) 
155 Ibid. p. 95 (Chapter IV) 
156 Anselm makes use of this analogy in Chapter II (Ibid. p. 94).  
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conceive of a painting, as an artist does before he or she commits it to the canvas, what 
would be greater than the mere conception of it? Limiting ourselves to a painting, the 
only answer would be if it existed in reality as well as in the mind. When applied to the 
concept of God, this form of reasoning yields a similar conclusion. If that than which no 
greater can be conceived were to exist only in relation to our understanding (esse in 
intellectu) it would surely not be that than which nothing greater can be conceived; for it 
would require little creative effort to imagine something greater, namely, something that 
exists both in relation to the understanding and in reality. In the former case, God’s 
existence is dependent on the human mind; in the latter, God’s existence is a fact that 
stands independently of all other things. 
 But suppose that than which nothing greater can be conceived were to have never 
existed, just as we can imagine a painting to have never existed. As Anselm is quick to 
point out, this is a sheer impossibility: “[for] if that than which a greater cannot be 
conceived could be conceived not to be, we would have an impossible contradiction: That 
than which a greater cannot be conceived would not be that than which a greater cannot 
be conceived.”157 So now we may return to the “fool” and see why he is mistaken. 
Implicit within the definition of God, as Anselm construes it, is a self-evident truth that 
mandates existence. The fool may utter the words “God does not exist,” but he most 
certainty cannot make such an assertion with a clear and distinct perception of its content; 
for Anselm’s argument invites mental analysis and as such, it does not focus on the 
experience of God or faith per se, but on the experience of human reason at work as 
almost an end in itself.   
                                                 
157 Ibid. p. 94 (Chapter III) 
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 Anselm’s ontological argument has had a profound influence on Western thought. 
His demonstration of God’s existence stands on its own as the first attempt at a self-
evident proof of a metaphysical first principle. This is not to say that philosophers and 
theologians who preceded Anselm did not attempt a similar project, but there is 
something remarkably unique about Anselm’s understanding of ontology and analyticity.  
This distinction will be illuminated shortly, but for the time being it is sufficient to note 
that Anselm has done for reason what Socrates did for intellectual piety: through Anselm, 
reason no longer existed subordinate to faith but paralleled it, complimenting what the 
heart could not put into language.  
 
St. Anselm and the Reorientation of Ancient Categories of Thought 
 
Anselm’s ontological proof for the existence of God brought about a radical 
reorientation of the ancient categories of thought and experience.158 In a paper delivered 
at Duke University Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, F.E. Cranz argues that 
this reorientation was not merely a break with the ancient and medieval epistemological 
traditions, but that it “had large consequences for the way in which the ancient tradition 
was thereafter understood.”159 For the remainder of this chapter, I would like to focus on 
the nature and implications of this shift as a way to lead into a more general discussion of 
identity in the thought of Francesco Petrarch.  
                                                 
158 Op. cit. F.E. Cranz. The Reorientation of Western Thought c. 1100 A.D. The Break with the Ancient 
Tradition and its Consequences for Renaissance and Reformation. Duke University Center for Medieval 
and Renaissance Studies, March 24, 1982, p.1.   
159 Ibid. p. 1 
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 Cranz begins his discussion of this change by contrasting the dominate modes of 
thought of the Greco-Roman world with the modes of thought and experience introduced 
by Anselm’s ontological argument. The analysis of this shift is structured in three 
interrelated phases: 1) epistemological, 2) psychological and 3) theological.160 As regards 
the first phase, Cranz argues that the ancients experienced knowledge as a conjunction 
between the knower and the object to be known.161 That is, the experience of coming to 
know an object was, for the Greeks and Romans, tantamount to being physically and 
spiritually united with the object that one knows or senses. Consider the following 
passage from M. F. Burnyeat’s article, “Plato on Why Mathematics is Good for the 
Soul”:  
For Plato, as for Aristotle, knowledge and understanding depend on receptivity. You 
submit your soul to be in-formed by the world as it is objectively speaking. A soul that 
assimilates the vast abstract system of mathematics on the curriculum is in turn 
assimilated to it. You come to be like, akin to, of the same family as, the nature of what is 
(in the sense of unqualified, context invariant being)…162  
Cranz himself cites numerous sources to support this claim. He quotes from Aristotle’s 
De anima III: “In what is without matter, what intellects and what is intellected are the 
same…Theoretical science and that which is so scienced are the same…Science in act is 
the same as the thing (to pragma).”163 Cranz cites another passage from De anima that 
captures more fully the unity that characterizes the ancient experience of knowledge: 
“…the intellect in intellecting becomes exactly what it intellects…Before the intellect 
                                                 
160 Cranz himself does not use this terminology. 
161 Ibid. p. 2 
162 M.F. Burnyeat. “Plato on Why Mathematics is Good for the Soul.” Ed. T. Smiley. Mathematics and 
Necessity in the History of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 70.  
163 Aristotle. De anima. Book III, 430a2 f. Quoted in: Op cit. F.E. Cranz, The Reorientation of Western 
Thought c. 1100 A.D., p. 3.  
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intellects in act, what intellects and what is intellected stand in relation to one another as 
other and opposed. But when they are in act, the intellect and what is intellected have 
become one; there is not longer a relationship and a contrast.”164  
 The second phase of the ancient experience incorporates a psychological 
component into the experience of knowing. Cranz argues that in coming to know an 
object, and consequently in being united with that object, the ancients experienced an 
“extensive self” that was conjoined with other objects within a single order of being.165 
Consider the following passage from Plotinus’ Ennead: “So you have entered into the 
All, and you did not remain in one of its parts, nor do you any longer say, ‘I extend so 
and so far’, for, having given up the ‘so and so far’, you have become all, though indeed 
you were all before.”166 There is a sense that the soul that Plotinus is describing is ever-
present among all beings, so much so that the “you” (the soul) may be construed as 
actually being one and the same as “all beings.”167 The “self,” as Cranz refers to it, is 
therefore “extended” in that the “self” and the “realm of all other beings” are potentially 
identical: the ancient experience of knowledge did not bring about a separation between 
the knower and the intended object to be known—a separation that today might be 
referred to as intentionality.168  
 The final phase of the ancient experience pertains more specifically to the 
experience of knowledge itself, that is, to the process by which knowledge is ascertained. 
                                                 
164 Ibid. p. 3  
165 Ibid. p. 3 
166 Ibid. p. 4 
167 Cranz cites an important passage from Aristotle’s De anima that supports this idea: “Now in 
summarizing what has been said about the soul, we say again that the soul is somehow all beings. The 
beings are either sensible or intelligible, and science is somehow the scienced, and sense the sensibles” 
(Aristotle. De anima, Book III, 8 432b20 f. Quoted in: Ibid. p. 4).   
168 Cf. Franz Brentano Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Routledge, 1995) and Daniel Dennett 
The Intentional Stance (MIT Press, 1989).  
                                                                                                       76
Cranz argues that the ancients experienced reason and argument as a form of vision. He 
cites two powerful passages from Augustine’s De Trinitate and the Soliloquies 
respectively to illustrate this point:  
There is this good and that good. Remove the ‘this’ and the ‘that’ and see, if you can, the 
good itself. Thus you will see God…169 
Reason who speaks with you promises that she will demonstrate (or show) God to your 
mind as the sun is demonstrated or shown to the eyes.170 
For Plato and Augustine alike, this notion of reason as culminating in a form of vision or 
“illumination” was central to the experience of knowledge. In the Timaeus, Plato captures 
this sense of “conjunctive vision” in a poignant visual metaphor:  
…when there is daylight around the visual stream it falls on its like and coalesces with it, 
forming a single uniform body in the line of sight, along which the stream from within 
strikes the external object. Because the stream and daylight are similar, the whole so 
formed is homogenous, and the motions caused by the steam coming into contact with an 
object or an object coming into contact with the stream penetrate right through the body 
and produce in the soul the sensation which we call sight.171  
Light from the sun joins with the light from the eye to form a visual steam that 
illuminates all objects of perception. For Plato, this experience of knowledge did not rest 
upon the “coherence of the argument,” but on vision, on seeing the truth with the “eye of 
the soul.”172    
 Anselm’s ontological argument radically transformed these categories of thought 
and experience. Moving away from the categories of conjunction, extension and vision, 
Anselm’s argument structures the experience of knowledge within a new “reason of 
                                                 
169 Augustine. De Trinitate, VIII 3. #4 (CC L, 272). Quoted in: F.E. Cranz. The Reorientation of Western 
Thought c. 1100 A.D., p. 4.  
170 Augustine. Soliloquies I, VI, #12. Quoted in: Ibid. p. 4-5  
171 Op cit. Plato. Timaeus, 45 (13).  
172 Cf. Op. cit. Plato. Republic, 517b-c. 
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faith” (ratio fidei).  Contrary to the unity that characterized the ancient experience of 
knowledge, Anselm’s ontological proof introduces a dichotomy between the knower (the 
Christian pilgrim) and the object to be known (God).173 The self is no longer extended 
across a single order of beings, but is confronted with two worlds, one of “meanings” 
(arguments, phrases, or “intellections”), and one of “things” (sensible beings).174 Cranz 
refers to this new self as an “intensive self,” one that depends not on receptivity for 
knowledge and understanding but on its own ability to create meaning. Accordingly, 
Anselm’s ontological proof of God propounds a theory of knowledge that rests almost 
entirely upon the coherence of the argument. As Anselm states in Responsio editoris X:  
The significance (significatio) of this utterance (‘that than which a greater cannot be 
thought’) contains so much force that what is spoken of is, by the very fact that it is 
understood or thought, necessarily proved really to exist and to be whatever ought to be 
believe about the divine substance.175  
Anselm believes that he has offered us a systematic proof of God’s existence that does 
not rely upon vision for its validity, but upon the mere coherence of meanings.  
 What is perhaps most striking about Anselm’s reformulation of the ancient 
categories of thought and experience is his own dissatisfaction with it. In one of the more 
personal passages of the Proslogion, he states:  
Have you found, o my soul, what you sought?...For if you have not found your God, how 
can He be that which you have found and that which you have understood Him to be with 
such certain truth and such true certainty? If you have found Him, why is it that you do 
                                                 
173 Op. cit. F.E. Cranz. The Reorientation of Western Thought c. 1100 A.D., p. 5.  
174 Ibid. p. 6  
175 Op. cit. Anselm. Proslogion, p. 134 (Responsio editoris X). Quoted in: Ibid. p. 6  
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not feel or experience (sentis) that which have found? Why, Lord God, does my soul not 
feel or experience you, if it has found you?176  
Anselm’s ontological proof lacks all the immediacy and ultimacy of the ancient 
experience of knowledge.177 Recall that for the ancients, argument and demonstration 
were experienced (sentire) as a form of direct and immediate vision. When the knower 
encountered an object it felt conjoined with this object across a single order of beings. 
Anselm’s proof not only renders such a conjunction impossible, but it relegates the 
experience of reason to the world of “meanings” alone. Anselm’s new reason is therefore 
operative only within the realm of the intellect, wherein the immediacy and fullness of 
ancient forms of vision are replaced by the logic and coherence of argument. “My soul 
strains to see more,” laments Anselm, “but beyond what it has already seen it peers only 
into darkness (tenebras).”178   
 Before moving on to an examination of Petrarch’s response to this new “reason of 
faith,” it is important to underscore the ethical implications of Anselm’s reorientation of 
the ancient categories of thought and experience. For the ancients, the ability to perceive 
and experience the beauty, order and harmony of the cosmos as a form of conjunctive 
vision had a transformative effect on the human soul. The perception of beauty, for the 
Greeks and Romans, aroused within the soul a longing (cupiditas) to become one with 
the beauty of truth, with the order and symmetry of the heavens. Through the 
contemplation and imitation of this order, the soul was inspired to reduce its own motions 
to order. As the great Greek astronomer, Claudius Ptolemy, wrote in his Almagest:  
                                                 
176 Anselm. Proslogion, Chapter XIV, p. 103. Quoted in : Ibid. p. 7  
177 Op. cit. F.E. Cranz. The Reorientation of Western Thought c. 1100 A.D., p. 8. 
178 Op. cit. Anselm. Proslogion, Chapter XIV, p. 103.  
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This science of stars can . . . better than any other, render an excellent service in 
connection with our concern for an eminently moral life. For from the example of the 
similarity, precise order, symmetry, and simplicity which we experience with divine 
beings (the heavenly bodies) it imparts to its practitioners love for divine beauty. What is 
more, through habit such an attitude of mind becomes second nature.179  
Astronomy, for the ancients, was, in many respects, tantamount to moral philosophy: 
through the contemplation of the heavens, the mind was transformed ethically by its 
desire to imitate the order of divine beauty.  
 Anselm’s ontological proof, with its attendant dichotomy between the knower and 
the known, and its focus on rational demonstration as opposed to the immediacy of 
vision, precluded the possibility of being ethically transformed through the contemplation 
of the divine. Anselm’s reason was concerned primarily with the “systematic coherence 
of an experienced faith”180 and as such, the ancient experience of receptivity, unity and 
conjunctive vision was replaced by a conception of human reason that was left almost 
entirely to the world of “meanings” (intentiones) alone, not of “things” or “actual 
beings.” For those who followed Anselm, the implications of the new scholasticism 
therefore stretched far beyond mere questions of epistemology; Anselm’s proof, which 
served as a springboard for the new scholastic theology, called into doubt the very ability 
of man to fashion an identity based on hitherto conceptions of the Good and of what it 
meant to live a pious and morally virtuous life.  
 
 
 
                                                 
179 Claudius Ptolemy. Almagest, 1. 7. 17 – 24. Quoted in Wildiers 1982 pp. 22 – 23. Op cit. Robert E. 
Proctor. “Cosmos: The Beauty Resulting from Order,” p. 23. 
180 Op. cit. F.E. Cranz. The Reorientation of Western Thought c. 1100 A.D., p. 17.  
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Chapter IV: Petrarch and the Moral Drama of the Self  
 
Recapturing the Immediacy of Vision: “Seeing with the Mind”  
 
Petrarch was acutely aware of the inadequacies of the new reason of 
scholasticism. On numerous occasions he speaks quite openly about his disdain for the 
failure of the new categories of thought to capture the immediacy and fullness of the 
ancient experience of knowledge. Thus he states in his Epistulae familiares:  
That prostituted philosophy which we see everywhere (vulgo). At what does it aim except 
scrupulously and anxiously to concern itself with petty questions and with words…Thus 
truth is entirely given over to forgetfulness, good morals are ignored, the very things 
themselves (res ipsae) are spurned in which lies that true philosophy which is never 
deceived…181 
By Petrarch’s time, the scholastic theology that Anselm had helped to initiate had 
degenerated into a discipline concerned primarily with the technique of logical and 
linguistic analysis. Far from developing the rules of logical analysis in a way that would 
illuminate and valorize the experience of faith, medieval scholars became increasingly 
preoccupied with the rules themselves, with the “internal signification of sentences and 
propositions.”182 It is thus not without reason that Petrarch complains in one of his letters 
that, “Our vanity has turned theology into dialectic.”183 
 Petrarch’s own hope is for the restoration of a philosophy that is grounded in 
“things,” in the sensible realities of this world, rather than in mere “words” or 
                                                 
181 Francesco Petrarch. Epistulae familiares, XVII 1, 7. Quoted in: Op. cit. F.E. Cranz. The Reorientation of 
Western Thought c. 1100 A.D., p. 10.  
182 Op. cit. Robert E. Proctor. Defining the Humanities, p. 39.  
183 Francesco Petrarch. Letters on Familiar Matters. Translated by Aldo S. Bernardo. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1982, X 5.  
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propositions.  We should aim “not for that windy and loquacious scholastic philosophy,” 
Petrarch exhorts, “but for the true one which dwells not only in books but also in souls 
and which is founded in things not in words.”184 It is clear, from passages such as these, 
that Petrarch was deeply dissatisfied with the new reason of scholasticism. Cranz notes 
that this dissatisfaction prompted Petrarch to resurrect the ancient program of “seeing 
with the mind” as a way to recapture the immediacy and fullness of the ancient 
experience of knowledge.  
 Petrarch’s strongest and most developed statement of this program of “seeing 
with the mind” appears in the Secret, a consolatory (consolatio) dialogue in three parts 
between Augustine and Petrarch in the presence of Lady Truth. Near the end of the first 
dialogue, Petrarch remarks to Augustine that he had recently chanced upon his De vera 
religione during a brief hiatus from his regular studies in philosophy and poetry. 
Augustine points out that although the book was written under the auspices of the 
Catholic faith, his inspiration for undertaking the work derived from pagan texts, 
specifically, from a passage in Cicero’s Tusculanae disputationes. Arguing against those 
who are unable to detach themselves from the somatic world, Augustine quotes Cicero as 
saying: “They could look at nothing with their mind, but judged everything by the sight 
of their eyes; yet a man of any greatness of understanding is known by his detaching his 
thought from objects of sense, and his meditations from the ordinary track in which 
others move.”185 
                                                 
184 Ibid. XII 3. 10. Op. cit. F.E. Cranz. The Reorientation of Western Thought c. 1100 A.D., p. 10.  
185 Cicero. Tusculanae disputationes, I, 16, #37. Quoted in: Francesco Petrarch. Petrarch’s Secret or The 
Soul’s Conflict with Passion. Three Dialogues Between Himself and S. Augustine. Translated by William 
H. Draper. Connecticut: Hyperion Press, Inc., 1978, p. 44 [my emphasis]. 
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 This ancient model of “seeing with the mind” figures prominently in Petrarch’s 
thought. Indeed, Petrarch makes mention of this program in a number of his principle 
works.186 Cranz observes, however, that Petrarch’s understanding of “seeing with the 
mind” was quite different from that of Cicero and Augustine. “The ancient ‘seeing with 
the mind’,” Cranz argues, “was a conjunctive vision of intelligible beings, and Petrarch 
has no such vision nor, indeed, any such intelligible beings.”187 Consider the following 
passage taken from Augustine’s De vera religione:  
We are reminded by the things we judge to see that by which we judge, and as we turn 
from the work of art to the law of the arts, we see with the mind that form (species) in 
comparison with which even those things fair through it are foul. ‘The invisible things of 
God from the creation of the world are clearly seen as they are intellected through what 
has been made.188 
Augustine’s employment of the program of “seeing with the mind” is intended to signify 
an ascent from the body, one that culminates in a vision by the mind of immaterial truths 
relating to the “law of the arts” and the “invisible things of God.”189 
 Petrarch’s own program of “seeing with the mind” is markedly different from that 
of Augustine. Consider the following passage from Petrarch’s Secret in which Augustine 
instructs Petrarch on how to meditate on the thought of death so that the experience sinks 
to the very depths of his heart190:    
                                                 
186 Cf. Francesco Petrarch. De vita solitaria, in Prose 353; Invective ed. Ricci p. 85 and 86, note; Op. cit. 
F.E. Cranz. Reorientation of Western Thought c. 1100 A.D., p. 11.  
187 Ibid. p. 11  
188 Romans, I. 20. Augustine, St. De vera religione, 110. Quoted in: Ibid. p. 11 
189 Ibid. p. 12 
190 Thus Augustine states: “I have no doubt that when you [Petrarch] turn over in your mind the many 
things you have learned, whether in the school of experience or in your reading of books, the thought of 
death has several times entered your head. But still it has not sunk down into your heart as deeply as it 
ought, nor is it lodged there as firmly as it should be.” Op. cit. Francesco Petrarch. Petrarch’s Secret or The 
Soul’s Conflict with Passion, p. 32.   
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It will not do that we hear that name but lightly, or allow the remembrance of it to slip 
quickly from our mind. No, we must take time to realize it. We must meditate with 
attention thereon. We must picture to ourselves the effect of death on each several part of 
our bodily frame, the cold extremities, the breast in the sweat of fever, the side throbbing 
with pain, the vital spirits running slower and slower as death draws near, the eyes 
sunken and weeping, every look filled with tears…all these things will come to mind and, 
so to speak, be ready to one’s hand, if one recalls what one has seen in any close 
observation of some deathbed where it has fallen to our lot to attend. For things seen 
cling closer to our remembrance than things heard.191 
This last sentence is crucial. For Petrarch, the act of “seeing with the mind” was, in 
effect, an exercise in remembrance. Petrarch invokes the ancient program of “seeing with 
the mind” not so that he may experience an ascent from his body, but so that he may 
experience in his imagination the sensuous presence of those who have passed. Petrarch’s 
program of “seeing with the mind” thus parallels that of Augustine and Cicero only in 
name: in his attempt to recapture the ancient experience of knowledge as a form of direct 
and immediate vision, Petrarch merely substitutes the ancient categories of conjunction 
and extension for an experience of reason that brings about “the presence of bodies 
imagined with sensible vividness.”192  
 Cranz’s insight into Petrarch’s attempt to recapture the immediacy and ultimacy 
of ancient forms of knowledge and experience touches upon a number of important 
themes that run throughout Petrarch’s work. In particular, Petrarch’s ubiquitous sense of 
death, his disdain for the new reason of scholasticism, and his desire to “go back” to the 
ancients as sources for moral inspiration are essential points of analysis for understanding 
his thought. What I would like to do for the remainder of this chapter is to explore some 
                                                 
191 Ibid. pp. 32-33 [my emphasis] 
192 Op. cit. F.E. Cranz. The Reorientation of Western Thought c. 1100 A.D., p. 12  
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of these themes in greater detail. Since Petrarch’s thought resists any attempt to unify it 
within a coherent structure or intellectual design, I will proceed with my analysis of his 
views on personal identity in a selective manner. In section one, I focus on Petrarch’s 
inner struggle, particularly as it relates to the conflict that he faced between the moral 
demands of his Christian faith and the intensity of his emotional commitment to Laura. In 
section two, I explore the various ways in which Petrarch attempts to resolve his inner 
crisis. Ultimately, I would submit that it is Petrarch’s inner conflict that marks his very 
identity. It is deep within that Petrarch experiences and expresses his most personal 
concerns about love, death and contingency; and it is a spiritual crisis that emanates from 
deep within that enjoins Petrarch to seek solace and inspiration in the lives of the 
ancients.  
 
Solo et pensoso… 
 
Petrarch’s inner struggle is marked from the outset by his profound and 
unrelenting love of Laura, his poetic muse and historical temptress. In sonnets, such as 
sonnet 211 in his Rime Sparse, Petrarch openly reveals the “enduring agon”193 that lies at 
the heart of their relationship. Writing on the eleventh anniversary of his first encounter 
with Laura, Petrarch confesses: “One thousand three hundred twenty seven, exactly at the 
first hour of the sixth day of April, I entered the labyrinth, nor do I see where I may get 
out of it.”194 Petrarch’s employment of the liturgical year—evoking the anniversaries of 
                                                 
193 I borrow this phrase from Roman Coles. See: Roman Coles. Beyond Gated Politics. Reflections for the 
Possibility of Democracy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004, xiv.  
194 Op. cit. The Norton Anthology of World Masterpieces, p. 1666.  
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Christ’s death and resurrection—and his reference to his love of Laura as a labyrinth, an 
endless and torturous maze of amorous wanderings, clearly highlights the frustration, and 
indeed the insecurity, that colored his attempts to secure spiritual salvation through self-
analysis. As Petrarch admits, with a heavy heart, in sonnet 189, he could never be sure 
that his love of Laura would lead him to the right “port”:  
Passa la nave mia colma d'oblio / per aspro mare, a mezza notte il verno, / enfra Scilla et 
Caribdi; et al governo / siede 'l signore, anzi 'l nimico mio.  
A ciascun remo un penser pronto et rio / che la tempesta e 'l fin par ch'abbi a scherno; / la 
vela rompe un vento humido eterno / di sospir', di speranze, et di desio. 
Pioggia di lagrimar, nebbia di sdegni / bagna et rallenta le già stanche sarte, / che son 
d'error con ignorantia attorto. 
Celansi i duo mei dolci usati segni; / morta fra l'onde è la ragion et l'arte, / tal 
ch'incomincio a desperar del porto.195  
The moral, albeit metaphorical, dilemma presented here is a very real one for 
Petrarch. I have quoted the sonnet in its entirety because I think that it paints an accurate 
portrait of Petrarch’s shifting, fragmented sense of self. Take, for example, the very first 
line of the sonnet: “Passa la nave mia colma d'oblio / per aspro mare.” Forgetfulness 
(colma d’oblio) is a familiar sin in the work of St. Augustine; those who are “forgetful,” 
at least in the spiritual sense, are those who have forgotten themselves and God. From the 
very first line, then, Petrarch is describing a self (his “nave,” or soul) that is adrift in the 
sea of life, wounded and divided from itself and God. His “enemy,” Love, spurs him on, 
but false hope and unrequited desire soon “break the sail” (la vela rompe). At the end of 
the sonnet, we meet Laura, whose conspicuous absence (Celansi i duo mei dolci [Laura’s 
                                                 
195 Francesco Petrarch. Canzoniere. Testo critico e introduzione di Gianfranco Contini. Torino: Giulio 
Einaudi editore, s.p.a., 1964, Song 189 (CLXXXIX), lines 1-14, p. 245.  
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eyes] usati segni) leads the poet to despair of the possibility of reaching his true 
destination (porto).196  
  This theme of love’s distance and its effects upon the self is put into even sharper 
relief in song 129 of Petrarch’s Canzoniere. Here, Petrarch speaks of the great distance, 
or “lontananza,” that separates him from his beloved. The song, with its rustic 
descriptions of the shady valleys and solitary slopes of the Italian countryside, carries 
with it the semblance of an exterior journey, the journey of the lover back to Vaucluse; 
but as is made clear from the opening line—Di pensier in pensier, di monte in monte—
the song’s “exteriority” is meant only to serve as a mirror for the interior journey of the 
lover.197 Canvassing the recesses of his mind, Petrarch reveals himself to be one who is 
dominated by the capricious, and, at times, maddening, power of love:  
Di pensier in pensier, di monte in monte / mi guida Amor, ch’ogni segnato calle / provo 
contrario a la tranquilla vita. / Se ‘n solitaria piaggia rivo o fonte / se ‘nfra duo poggi 
siede ombrosa valle, / ivi s’acqueta l’alma sbigottita ; / et come Amor l’envita / or ride or 
piange or teme or s’assecura, / e ’l volto, che lei segue ov’ella il mena, / si turba et  
rasserena et in un esser picciol tempo dura: / onde a la vista uom di tal vita esperto / 
diria : “Questo arde et di suo stato è incerto.” 
Per alti monti et per selve aspre trovo / qualche riposo; ogni abitato loco / è nemico 
mortal degli occhi miei. / A ciascun passo nasce un penser novo / de la mia donna, che 
sovente in gioco / gira ’l tormento ch ‘i’ porto per lei; / et a pena vorrei / cangiar questo 
mio viver dolce amaro, / ch ‘i’ dico: “Forse anco ti serva Amore / ad un tempo migliore: / 
                                                 
196 It is noteworthy that Petrarch does not specify the nature of his destination: is he referring to his final 
destination in Christian terms, as Dante was in Paradiso; or is “the port” simply a metaphor for the 
consummation of his earthly love for Laura? The inbuilt tension and ambiguity of the sonnet is, as I would 
argue, emblematic of Petrarch’s own inner crisis and habitual uncertainty.  
197 Op cit. Giuseppe Mazzotta. The Worlds of Petrarch, p. 52. 
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forse a te stesso vile, altrui se’caro”: / et in questa trapasso sospirando: / “Or potrebbe 
esser ver ? or come ? or quando ?”198 
Petrarch’s mind is restless. Unable to control his thoughts under the dominion of 
Love, his mental states range from laughter and sadness, to fear, insecurity and utter 
confusion (“ride or piange or teme or s’assecura…”). Wherever Petrarch looks, he sees 
Laura’s face alive “ne l’acqua chiara et sopra l’erba verde, et nel troncon d’un faggio.” 
His only solace, it seems, comes from the shade of some solitary slope or valley.199 But 
the “ombrosa valle,” as Giuseppe Mazzotta rightly points out, represents only an illusion 
of consolation: “Shade is not the privation of light; it is the hidden light. In a way, it is as 
if the pure light of judgment were intolerable to him.”200 
 The song’s final stanza ends with a powerful image of the lover’s fragmentation 
and interior distance from himself. Directing his attention—and the song itself—to 
Vaucluse, where Laura and his heart reside, Petrarch leaves us with these words: 
“Canzone, oltra quell’alpe, / là dove il ciel è più sereno et lieto, / mi rivedrai sovr’ un 
ruscel corrente / ove l’aura si sente / d’un fresco et odorfiero laureto; / ivi è ’l mio cor et 
quella che ’l m’invola: / qui veder poi l’imagine mia sola.”201 Petrarch employs a familiar 
literary conceit to create a sense of disjunction between his self and the landscape. While 
the lover’s interior journey, we are told initially, mirrors the exterior landscape of the 
Italian countryside, the song’s end refers us to a place that lies “oltra quell’alpe,” beyond 
                                                 
198 Op. cit. Francesco Petrarch. Canzoniere, Song 129 (CXXIX), S. 1 & 2, lines 1-26, p. 179. 
199 “Se ‘n solitaria piaggia rivo o fonte / se ‘nfra duo poggi siede ombrosa valle, / ivi s’acqueta l’alma 
sbigottita” (Ibid. S. 1, lines 4-6).  
200 Giuseppe Mazzotta. The Worlds of Petrarch, p. 52 [my emphasis]. Thus Petrarch writes: “ma mentre 
tener fiso / posso al primo pensier la mente vaga, / et mirar lei et obliar me stesso, / sento Amor si da 
presso / che del suo proprio error l’alma s’appaga; / in tante parti et si belle la veggio / che se l’error 
durasse, altro non cheggio” (Francesco Petrarch. Canzoniere, Song 129,  S. 3, lines 33-39). 
201 Op. cit. Francesco Petrarch. Canzoniere, Song 129, S. 6, lines 66-72.  
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the present space of the poet.202 “Here,” in the Italian landscape, Petrarch tells us, “one 
can see only my image (l’imagine mia sola).”  
 A familiar motif in Petrarch’s work, then, is this notion of a self that is divided 
from itself,203 a self that is torn between what it loves and what it knows it ought to love. 
As Petrarch confesses in a letter to Giacomo Colonna, a close friend and bishop of the 
town of Lombez in Gascony, in 1336, “my wishes fluctuate and my desires conflict, and 
in their conflict they tear me apart. Thus does the outer man struggle with the inner…”204 
Even at a relatively early point in his literary career, Petrarch is deeply aware of what will 
prove to be a perennial tension in his life’s work, namely, the task of reconciling his 
penchant for an inclusive classicism with the moral demands of his Christian faith.  
Nowhere perhaps is this tension more clearly articulated, or more intimately 
analyzed, than in his Secret, a dialogue between Petrarch and, as may be surmised from 
the context, a personification of his Christian moral conscience in the form of St. 
Augustine. For the remainder of this section, I would like concentrate on Petrarch’s 
Secret as a way to draw out more explicitly this inner tension and its relation to his 
enduring struggle with death and the experience of contingency.  
  In Book III of the Secret, Petrarch presents the reader with perhaps his most 
sustained and personal account of the tension that he felt between his love of Laura and 
the spiritual exigencies of his Christian faith. The dialogue opens on the third day of 
Petrarch’s engagement with St. Augustine, and takes as its point of departure a familiar 
dilemma: “…you are still held in bondage, on your right hand and on your left,” Petrarch 
                                                 
202 Op. cit. Giuseppe Mazzotta. The Worlds of Petrarch, p. 50.  
203 For an interesting parallel in the work of Augustine see: Augustine. Confessions, Book VIII Chapter 
VIII: “tum in illa grandi rixa interioris domus meae…” 
204 Op. cit. Letters from Petrarch. Selected and Translated by Morris Bishop. London: Indiana University 
Press, 1966, II 9. Quoted in: Nicholas Mann. Petrarch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 67. 
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has Augustine state, “by two strong chains...Love and glory.”205 This dilemma is 
compounded, as Augustine dismally concludes, by the fact that Petrarch refuses to 
acknowledge the sinful nature of his two adamantine chains, particularly the chain of 
love. Responding to Augustine’s claim that a stubborn ignorance with respect to one’s 
sinful nature is the climax of all evils, Petrarch retorts, “why in the world should I not 
think that the course which I indicated is right? No, I never have thought and I never shall 
think any truth more indisputable than that these two passions, which you cast at me as a 
reproach, are the very noblest of all.”206 
  Petrarch’s inner debate on the subject of his earthly attachment to Laura revolves 
around three points of contention, or “loves,” as Augustine might refer to them: a) the 
nobility or virtue of the object of his love, b) the purity, or “manner,” of his love for this 
object, and c) the implications of this love for his moral character. Of the veracity of the 
first of these contentions Petrarch speaks, at least initially, with the utmost conviction. He 
contrasts Laura, a being whom he considers to be of divine nature, with Thais and Livia, 
both of whom were merely mortal women: “she of whom you [Augustine] have set out to 
speak is a mind that has no care for things of earth, and burns only with the love of what 
is heavenly. In whose face, unless truth is an empty word, a certain divine loveliness 
shines out; whose character is the image and picture of perfect honor.”207 Petrarch goes 
on to note that in his love for Laura “there has never been anything dishonorable, never 
anything of the flesh, never anything that any man could blame unless it were its mere 
intensity.”208 Indeed, it was Laura, Petrarch admits, “who turned my youthful soul away 
                                                 
205 Op. cit. Francesco Petrarch. Petrarch’s Secret or The Soul’s Conflict with Passion, pp. 107-109.  
206 Ibid. p. 110 
207 Ibid. p. 114  
208 Ibid. p. 120 
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from all that was base, who drew me…by a grappling chain, and forced me to look 
upwards.”209  
 Augustine, Petrarch’s super ego, as it were, is not convinced by these arguments. 
He points out that Petrarch’s love for Laura has served only to distract, or “detach,” his 
heart from the true Creator. “By sitting at her [Laura’s] feet,” Augustine argues, “you 
[Petrarch] became so infatuated with the charm of her above as to studiously neglect 
everything else.”210 In other words, Augustine accuses Petrarch of the sin of idolatry, of 
placing Laura above God and thus “forgetting” the “true order” of things.211 In the final 
stanza of sonnet 126 in his Rime sparse, Petrarch touches upon this inner conflict with 
painful honesty:  
How many times did I say to myself then, full of awe: “She was / surely born in 
Paradise!” / Her divine bearing and her face and her words and her sweet / smile had so 
laden me with forgetfulness / and so divided me from the true image, that I was sighing: / 
“How did I come here and when?” thinking I was in Heaven, not / there where I was. 
From then on this grass has pleased me so that / elsewhere I have no peace.212 
The pathos of the passage lies precisely in Petrarch’s inability, and indeed reluctance, to 
turn away from the entangling temptations of this world. His love of Laura is so 
profound, so all consuming, that despite its deleterious effects—a forgetfulness of both 
self and God—he is unable, and indeed unwilling, to tear himself away from his earthly 
attachments, from the green “grass” of worldly pleasures.  
                                                 
209 Ibid. p. 121 
210 Ibid. p. 123 
211 Ibid. p. 124 
212 Op. cit. Francesco Petrarch. Rime sparse, Sonnet 126, lines 32-39. The Norton Anthology of World 
Masterpieces, p. 1677.  
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 Petrarch’s only consolation, it would seem, is the purity of love that he feels for 
Laura, the honor and respect he bestows upon her as an “image of virtue.”213 By 
Augustine’s lights, however, this love is nothing more than the burning hot flame of 
passion. As he suggests in a later passage, “Do you [Petrarch] mean to assert that if the 
same soul had been lodged in a body ill-formed and poor to look upon, you would have 
taken equal delight therein?”214 Petrarch tries to exculpate himself by pointing to the fact 
that “the soul itself cannot be discerned.” But were it possible for the soul to be visible to 
the naked eye, as Petrarch continues in his defense, he would surely have “loved its 
beauty even though its dwelling-place were poor.”215 Augustine is quick to point out that 
this view merely bolsters his initial claim, namely, that Petrarch’s gaze is moved by the 
“bodily form”216 alone, by the sensuous and material passions of this world. Consider the 
following passage—telling in its similarity to the conflict that Petrarch describes in 
“Dialogue the Third” of the Secret—taken from Petrarch’s popular work, De remediis 
utruisque fortune:   
Joy: I am enjoying a passionate love. 
Reason: You will be overpowered by the snares of passion.  
Joy: I am burning with a passionate love.  
Reason: You are right to say burning. For love is a hidden fire, a pleasing wound, a sweet 
bitterness,217 a delightful disease, an agreeable torture, a charming death.218 
                                                 
213 Cf. the distinction that Petrarch draws between common and noble love in “Dialogue the Third,” 
Petrarch’s Secret or The Soul’s Conflict with Passion, pp. 110-111.  
214 Ibid. p. 125  
215 Ibid. p. 126 
216 Ibid. p. 126  
217 Petrarch often encapsulates his inner struggle in oxymorons, such as “a sweet bitterness.” Recall, for 
example, Petrarch’s earlier use of “dolce amaro” in Canzoniere, Song 129, line 21 (see above: p. 85).   
218 Francesco Petrarch. De remediis utriusque fortune, I 69. Quoted in: Nicholas Mann. Petrarch. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 77. 
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Joy and Reason, Petrarch and Augustine, Will and Intellect seem to be at odds 
with one another. Once again we see, although never as explicitly as we do in St. 
Augustine’s writings, the fundamental role of the will in Petrarch’s moral life. It is the 
will, or desire (joy), that relates thinking to action, and it is the will, as Petrarch’s 
criticism of Aristotle’s Ethics in De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia seems to 
suggest,219 that must be the central point of focus for those seeking to live an ethical life.  
 What emerges from Petrarch’s introspective account in the Secret is just how 
deeply divided he is between the forces of passion (the will) and the strictures of reason 
(the intellect). On the one hand, his will tells him that there is nothing dishonorable about 
his love for Laura. Indeed, it is his love for Laura, Petrarch believes, that “first taught 
[him] how to escape the vulgar crowd.”220 On the other hand, his reason tells him that it 
is his pathological love of Laura that has facilitated his flight from God, that has 
prompted him to choose “the left-hand path,” the “more broad and easy” path, over the 
“steep and narrow” path that leads back home to God.221 Recall, Augustine says, “what 
you were when that plague [your love of Laura] seized upon you soul; how suddenly you 
fell to bemoaning, and came to such a pitch of wretchedness that you felt a morbid 
pleasure in feeding on tears and sighs.”222  
 The only remedy, Augustine suggests, is to break away from the weight of one’s 
passions, to “ready the soul,” as he says, so that it may take flight. Near the end of the 
third dialogue, Augustine thus implores Petrarch to “sever your soul from that which 
                                                 
219 Cf. Francesco Petrarch. De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia. Referenced in: Francesco Petrarca 
Invectives. Edited and Translated by David Marsh. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 315-
321. 
220 Op. cit. Francesco Petrarch. Petrarch’s Secret or The Soul’s Conflict with Passion, p. 122.  
221 Ibid. p. 129. See also: Francesco Petrarch. Letter to Dionisio da Borgo San Sepolero. The Ascent of 
Mount Ventoux. The Norton Anthology of World Masterpieces, pp. 1668-1669.   
222 Ibid. p. 133 
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weighs it down and go away without hope of return. You will discover then, but not 
before, what absence is able to do for the soul’s healing.”223 There are two important 
concepts contained within this injunction: a) the utility of solitude and b) the imperative 
of having the ethical courage to “make a leap,” so to speak, in the face of uncertainty. 
The latter of the two concepts evokes the familiar maxim of Fides quaerens intellectum. 
The former, however, is slightly more complicated in origin and must be considered in 
tandem with sonnet 35 in Petrarch’s Canzoniere. 
Solo et pensoso i più deserti campi / vo mesurando a passi tardi et lenti, / et gli occhi 
porto per fuggire intenti / ove vestigio human l’arena stampi.  
Altro schermo non trovo che mi scampi / dal manifesto accorger de le genti, / perchè 
negli altri d’allegrezza spenti / di fuor si legge com’io dentro avampi: / 
si ch’io mi credo omai che monti et piagge / et fumi et selve sappian di che tempre / sia la 
mia vita, ch’è celata altrui. / Ma pur si aspre vie nè si selvagge / cercar no so ch’Amor 
non venga sempre / ragionando con meco, et io co llui.224 
“Solo et pensoso.” In arguably one of his most moving and revealing sonnets, 
Petrarch tells us that he often seeks solitude as a way to center his many, and at times 
contradictory, thoughts about love. As the opening stanza suggests, Petrarch’s aim is not 
merely to withdraw into the recesses of a solitary landscape, but to sink deep within 
himself so that he may avoid the stultifying gaze of society. “Ove vestigio human l’arena 
stampi,” Petrarch admits, he will promptly flee (fuggire) so as to preserve the sanctity and 
authenticity of his own interiority. Mazzotta, in his compelling analysis of the sonnet, 
makes a point of noting that beneath the apparent serenity of the act of solitude, 
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Petrarch’s “avoidance of others as a preamble to reaching the depths of [himself]…gives 
rise to a number of crucial questions which steadily engage [his] attention.”225  
 These “crucial questions,” I would submit, must be understood within the context 
of Petrarch’s inner debate in the third dialogue of the Secret. Counseling Petrarch against 
the dangers of fleeing into a state of solitude without first delivering the soul from its 
earthly shackles, Augustine states: “if your soul is neither cured nor made ready, this 
change and frequent moving from place to place will only stir up its grief…In whatever 
place you are, to whatever side you turn, you will behold the face, you will hear the voice 
of her whom you have left.”226 That such a counsel of prudence comes from Augustine, 
Petrarch’s moral conscience, should not be overlooked. Consider the ultimate effects of 
Petrarch’s solitary retreat as he describes them in sonnet 35. Initially, the flight to solitude 
appears to provide a measure of solace for Petrarch. His poetic flight into the countryside 
brings him into intimate contact with nature, so much so that the landscape itself reflects 
the temper of the poet’s inner life: “si ch’io mi credo omai che monti et piagge / et fiumi 
et selve sappian di che tempre / sia la mia vita, ch’è celata altrui.”227 The integration 
between poet, or lover, and the mountains, shores, and rivers of the landscape is a 
familiar motif in Petrarch’s work, particularly in his sonnets. But as Mazzotta observes, 
the integration between self and nature does not entail “a state of repose in the illusion of 
a regained unity between man and nature.”228 On the contrary, Petrarch’s retreat inward 
brings only a deeper awareness of the conflicting passions that tear his soul asunder: 
“Altro schermo non trovo che mi scampi / dal manifesto accorger de le genti, / perchè 
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negli altri d’allegrezza spenti / di fuor si legge com’io dentro avampi.” Beneath the 
facade of a solitudo that confers order upon the self, Petrarch’s journey within, as 
Augustine forewarns, stirs only grief.  
 Grief, strife, depression, and anxiety. These, then, are the emotions that Petrarch 
reveals in his most personal and intimate of moments. What is striking, in my view, is 
how often Petrarch relates these emotions to the experience of death. As the following 
passage from the final letter of his Familiares attests, the notion of life as a slow, 
protracted movement toward death cast a long shadow over Petrarch’s life and work: 
“We are all constantly dying,” Petrarch writes, “I while writing these words, you while 
reading them, others while hearing or not hearing them…we are both dying, we all are 
dying, we are always dying.”229 Death, or rather, an acute sense of the inexorable passage 
of time, haunted Petrarch throughout his life. But it wasn’t simply the experience of death 
that Petrarch so greatly feared; as his later writings confirm, it was the fortuitous nature 
of death, the apparent contingency of death that roused such great anxiety within his soul. 
Writing of the death of one his closest friends, Franceschino degli Albizzi, Petrarch offers 
us an impassioned account of the egregious deceptions of Lady Fortune:  
So often deceived, so often made sport of, we are unable to shake off the habit of hoping, 
and a credulity deceived a thousand times over, so great is the sweetness, albeit false, of 
happiness. How many times have I not said to myself, “O madman, O blind man forgetful 
of your condition, look here, take note, pay attention, stop, reflect, make a permanent, 
enduring, indelible sign. Remember this deception and that one. Never hope for anything. 
Believe nothing of Fortune: she is false, inconstant, capricious, and untrustworthy. First 
you knew her gentleness and charms, then later her severities. Already tried by this 
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deadly monster, you need no teacher; therefore reflect upon your own examples and be 
aware of entering into any dealings with her.230 
It is this notion of a “habit of hoping” that comes across so strongly in Petrarch’s 
writings. In the third dialogue of Petrarch’s Secret, Augustine tries to broach the 
possibility of Laura’s untimely death. Petrarch’s response is telling. “I know it,” he 
replies, acknowledging the feasibility of such an occurrence, “But the stars in their 
courses will not so fight against me as to prevent the order of Nature by hastening her 
death like that. First came I into this world and I shall be first to depart.”231 Again and 
again one sees in Petrarch’s thought a vain hope, despite sound evidence to the contrary, 
that events beneath the circle of the moon will play out according to some higher order or 
divine purpose.  
 That his life does not play out according to any such order naturally leads Petrarch 
to states of prolonged depression and despair: 
 Every time that fortune pushes me back one step, I stand firm and courageous, recalling 
to myself that often before I have been struck in the same way and yet have come off the 
conqueror; if, after that, she presently deals me a sterner blow, I begin to stagger 
somewhat; if then she returns to the charge a third or fourth time, driven by force, I 
retreat, not hurriedly but step by step, to the citadel of Reason.  
If fortune still lays siege to me there with all her troops, and if to reduce me to surrender, 
she piles up the sorrows of our human lot, the remembrance of my old miseries and the 
dread of evils yet to come, then, at last, hemmed in on all sides, seized with terror at these 
heaped up calamities, I bemoan my wretched fate, and feel rising in my very soul this 
bitter disdain of life.232  
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In one sense, Petrarch is able to overcome his melancholy through writing. It is 
noteworthy in this regard that the Secret, Petrarch’s most sustained attempt at self-
analysis, ends in a compromise of sorts: while acknowledging his worldly pursuits to be 
of a sinful nature, he nevertheless maintains the nobility of his life’s ambitions and 
desires. In letter of 1339 this conviction comes out with vivid force:  
Although very intelligent and learned men may think otherwise, human exertion in one 
way or another can, in this prison of the body, merit and hope for this happiness of which 
I speak, but it cannot embrace and hold on to it. For it is in this stadium that our life’s 
race is run; the end is where the exertion comes to rest. And we are not alone in this 
opinion; for what else does Cicero mean when he says that this life is a journey towards 
heaven? Nevertheless, this mortal life has, now and then, something similar to the eternal 
life, so that if it is not yet happy—for happiness is only that to which nothing can be 
added—this mortal life can still look down on human miseries far below it, and, standing 
below, it can still shine with the light from above.233  
“For it is in this stadium,” Petrarch tells us, “that our life’s race is run.” Perhaps no other 
statement more fully captures the radicality of Petrarch’s intellectual program. It is here, 
we are told, in this world, that we must relentlessly seek out happiness; and it is here, in 
this “mortal life,” that we may hope to approximate something of the life eternal. The 
contrast with Augustine is significant. In the first dialogue of the Secret, Augustine offers 
Petrarch the following advice: “What I had set out to do with you was to make clear that 
the first step in avoiding the distresses of this mortal life and raising the soul to higher 
things is to practice meditation on death and on man’s misery; and that the second is to 
have a vehement desire and purpose to rise.”234 Considering the extent to which 
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Petrarch’s vision of the moral life and that of Augustine’s diverge, it is not surprising that 
Petrarch’s approach to resolving his inner crisis differed drastically from that of his 
Christian (scholastic) contemporaries.  
 
A Physician to his Soul  
 
In a letter to Tommaso da Messina in 1340, Petrarch writes of the innate power of 
words to alleviate the pain and suffering of his soul:  
I could not easily say what certain familiar and well-known voices, not only conceived in 
my heart but brought out by my lips, with which I am wont to arouse my sleeping soul, 
do for me when I am alone, and how enjoyable it is, moreover, to go back, now and then, 
over my own writings, or those of others, and what a weight of bitter and heavy cares I 
feel lifted from my shoulders through this reading. At times I am helped all the more by 
my own writings, the more they fit my own languors—writings which the conscious hand 
of the listless physician applies to himself where he feels the pain to be. And this I could 
never do unless the words themselves caressed my ears, and moving me to read them 
over and over again by a certain innate power of sweetness, gradually sank down inside 
of me, and pierced me there with their hidden points.235  
Reading, in addition to writing, provided Petrarch a measure of solace and defense 
against the fitful bouts of depression that he suffered throughout his life. Note, however, 
the nature of Petrarch’s reading practice. Reading was not merely an aesthetic or 
pedagogical experience for Petrarch; it was a deeply personal and therapeutic event. 
Petrarch read so that the words themselves would sink down deep within him, healing 
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him, and piercing his “hidden points.” Petrarch likens himself to a “listless physician” 
who applies the aroma of words to the deepest caverns of his soul.  
To gauge the radicality of this practice, consider Petrarch’s reading experience in 
relation to that of St. Augustine. Near the end of Book VIII of his Confessions, Augustine 
describes, in moving prose, the events leading up to his conversion to Christianity:  
I was saying these things and weeping in the most bitter contrition of my heart, when 
suddenly I heard the voice of a boy or a girl I know not which—coming from the 
neighboring house, chanting over and over again, ‘Pick it up, read it; pick it up, read 
it’...So, damming the torrent of my tears, I got to my feet, for I could not but think that 
this was a divine command to open the Bible and read the first passage I should light 
upon…I snatched it up, opened it, and in silence read the paragraph on which my eyes 
first fell: ‘Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife 
and envying, but put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh to 
fulfill the lusts thereof’ [Romans 13:13]. I wanted to read no further, nor did I need to. 
For instantly, as the sentence ended, there was infused in my heart something like the 
light of full certainty and all the gloom of doubt vanished away.236 
It is not the words, I would argue, but the message of St. Paul that “infused” Augustine’s 
heart with the light of certainty; and it is through the internalization of this message that 
Augustine is then drawn upward toward God. 
 Petrarch’s own “conversion experience,” so to speak, is markedly different than 
that of Augustine. In his letter to Dionisio da Borgo San Sepolcro, known to posterity as 
“The Ascent of Mount Ventoux,” Petrarch describes a journey that he took with his 
brother to the top of Mount Ventoux, a mountain not far from Petrarch’s home in 
Vaucluse. Upon reaching the peak of the summit, Petrarch tells us that it occurred to him 
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to take out his copy of St. Augustine’s Confessions, a book of small size, he remarks, but 
infinite in its wisdom and charm.237 His eyes fix on a passage that reads: “And men go to 
admire the high mountains, the vast floods of the sea, the huge streams of the rivers, the 
circumference of the ocean, and the revolutions of the stars—and desert themselves.”238  
Petrarch’s reaction to these words is quite consequent. “In truth,” he tells us,  
I was satisfied that I had seen enough of the mountain; I turned my inward eye upon 
myself, and from that time not a syllable fell from my lips until we had reached the 
bottom again…I thought in silence of the lack of good counsel in us mortals, who neglect 
what is noblest in ourselves, scatter our energies in all directions, and waste ourselves in 
a vain show, because we look about us for what is to be found only within.239  
Instead of drawing Petrarch out of himself and toward the “invisible things of God,” 
Augustine’s words serve as a catalyst for a deep and personal inner experience. That is to 
say, it is not Augustine’s message, but the sound and beauty of his words that facilitates 
Petrarch’s retreat into the self. Recall what Petrarch claims at the end of the passage 
quoted above: “we look about us for what is to be found only within.” The notion of there 
being “an ascent,” a lifting of the self toward something beyond it, is wholly absent in 
Petrarch’s thought. The “conversion” that he describes is one that takes place not in 
conjunction with God, or with “other beings,” but in the intimacy and silence of his own 
self-presence. 
It is instructive, in this regard, to compare Petrarch’s words to those of Augustine 
in Book X of his Confessions. Reflecting on the difficulties of his own conversion, 
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Augustine confesses to God: “I have learned to love you late! You were within me, and I 
was in the world outside myself. I searched for you outside myself and, disfigured as I 
was, I fell upon the lovely things of your creation. You were within me, but I was not 
with you.”240 It is tempting to read this passage in a post-Anselmian light, as one in which 
the autonomous subject expresses an intimate awareness of its own self-awakening and 
acquisition of knowledge. However, as I argued in Chapter two, Augustine’s employment 
of the language of inwardness is intended to serve only as a medium of communication 
through which he could come into contact with reflections of the Divine image: by 
turning inward, Augustine was drawn upward toward God.241  
Petrarch’s reading practice, in contrast, was remarkably subjective in nature. 
Petrarch read not so that he might be drawn upward toward God, but so that he might 
apply the therapeutic sound of words to the wounds of his inner self. In a letter to 
Boccaccio, Petrarch writes of the power of words, particular those of the great Latin 
writers, such as Virgil, Flaccus, Severinus, and Tullius, to penetrate the very depths of his 
soul. “[I read them] not once,” Petrarch admits,  
but thousands of times, nor did I rush (cucurri) over but rather rested (incubui) upon 
them, and remained in them with all the powers of my mind…These writings have 
entered into me so intimately, and are fixed not only in my memory but also in the 
marrow of my bones, and have so become one with my mind (ingenium), that even if I 
were never to read them again, they would remain embedded in me, having set their roots 
in the deepest part of my soul.242 
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Reading the Latin writers was an act of redemption for Petrarch: by internalizing the 
sounds and beauty of classical Latin, Petrarch was able to heal the innermost maladies of 
his soul without recourse to God, faith or the prospect of divine grace.  
The consolatory effect of classical Latin was, however, only partially responsible 
for Petrarch’s love and study of the ancients. As he reveals in a letter to Giovanni 
Colonna in the late 1330s, he also found moral inspiration in the exempla of their lives. 
Thus he states in his “Defense of Quotations”:  
…if anyone asks why I so abound with quotations and seem to dwell on them so 
lovingly, I can merely reply that I think my reader’s taste is like mine. Nothing moves me 
so much as the quoted maxims of great men. I like to rise above myself, to test my mind 
to see if it contains anything solid or lofty, or stout and firm against ill-fortune, or to find 
if my mind had been lying to me about itself. And there is no better way of doing this 
except by direct experience, the surest mistress—than by comparing one’s mind with 
those it would most like to resemble.243 
“Nothing moves me so much as the quoted maxims of great men.” In addition to the 
therapeutic qualities of classical Latin, Petrarch tells us that he often turned to the power 
of historical examples to garner courage in the face of his life’s many adversities. When 
Petrarch looked to the ancients he was thus engaging in a form of “moral research,” as 
Eugenio Garin terms it,244 in order to test the fortitude of his character and explore the 
possibilities of constructive change within himself.  
 Examples within Petrarch’s work regarding the power of historical examples are 
quite common.245 Perhaps the clearest expression of Petrarch’s moral relationship to the 
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ancients, particularly for the purposes of identifying this notion of a “personal self” that 
runs throughout much of his earlier writings, appears in his letter to Giovanni Colonna. 
Near the end of the letter, Petrarch writes of the great Roman general, Caius Marius, who 
underwent surgery to remove a varicose vein without being tied down, as was generally 
the custom. “Before Marius,” Petrarch observes, 
it was customary for everyone who underwent surgery to be tied down, for as it was 
believed that pain in the body could not be overcome by strength in the soul, people 
sought the aid of bonds. Marius was the first to be cut without being bound, but after him 
many were. Why, I ask, unless because the example of such a brave and steadfast man 
encouraged other souls to imitate him, and, to use the words of his compatriot, his 
authority had power (valuit autoritas)?246  
By comparing his soul to that of Marius, Petrarch was able to calibrate the fortitude of his 
own character with the “strength of soul” that Marius displayed during his operation. 
Marius thus becomes for Petrarch not merely a model of historical significance, but a 
source of moral and spiritual inspiration. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that Petrarch 
renders the comparison between himself and Marius in terms of inner dispositions, or 
“souls.” That is to say, the external actions of Marius do not bear significantly, if at all, 
on Petrarch’s reading of his life nor on his decision not to be strapped down during his 
surgery. What is of concern for Petrarch is Marius’ inner character, the strength of his 
soul to overcome the pain in his body.  
 That Petrarch is able to use the example of Marius in this way depends upon one 
fundamental, albeit implicit, assumption: the existence of a “unique and autonomous self 
which he could objectify, act upon, and compare to other such autonomous selves” across 
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time.247 In other words, Petrarch’s ability to find consolation in the exempla of ancient 
heroes required that he experience his own being as a personal center of thought and 
feeling which could be objectified and related to other such personal selves across the 
spectrum of history.248 That the ancients themselves did not share this reading of selfhood 
or individual agency can be evinced by looking at Cicero’s own account of Marius in his 
Tusculan Disputations. Near the end of Book II, Cicero speaks of Marius as a man (vir) 
who exemplified the attributes of a true Roman:  
But Caius Marius, a man from the countryside, yet truly a man (rusticanus vir, sed plane 
vir), refused to be bound, as I said, when he was cut. Nor is it said that anyone before 
Marius was cut unbound. Why then were others after him? His authority had power 
(Vlauit auctoritas). Do you not therefore see that harm (malum) is a question of opinion 
(opinio), not of nature? And yet Marius himself showed that the bite of pain was sharp, 
for he did not offer the other leg. In this way he bore his pain as a man (vir), and as a 
human being (homo) did not want to bear greater pain unless it were necessary. 
Everything, therefore, lies in this, that you master yourself. But I have shown now what 
self-mastery is. And this reflection (cogitatio) on what most befits patience, fortitude, and 
greatness of soul, not only curbs the soul, but even, in a certain way makes the pain 
milder.249  
Cicero’s account of Marius differs sharply from that of Petrarch. The portrait that Cicero 
presents is not one of an individual imbued with an inner “strength of soul” (animi 
robor), as Petrarch recounts, but of a man who rose to exemplify the virtues of vir and 
homo. As Robert E. Proctor observes, Cicero’s descriptions of Marius “take our thoughts 
away from Marius and lead us to the contemplation of the universal, transpersonal 
virtues—patience, fortitude, and greatness of soul. Petrarch, on the other hand, tells the 
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Marius story in such a way that our gaze rests firmly on Marius.”250 Whereas in 
Petrarch’s account we are instructed to consider the significance of Marius’ inner 
character, Cicero enjoins us to look at Marius’ actions and their relation to what it meant 
to be an individual in the social network of ancient Rome.  
 Petrarch’s account of Marius thus discloses a profoundly novel development in 
the history of western thought. We moderns take it for granted that we are possessive of 
an inner dimension, an autonomous and personal self which may be objectified and 
compared to other such selves across time. As Charles Taylor writes in his Sources of the 
Self, this notion of an interior, “personal” self is a defining characteristic of modern 
conceptions of identity:  
 Our modern notion of the self is related to, one might say constituted by, a certain sense 
(or perhaps a family of senses) of inwardness…We think of our thoughts, ideas, or 
feelings as being ‘within’ us, while the objects in the world which these mental states 
bear on are ‘without’. The unconscious is for us within, and we think of the depths of the 
unsaid, the unsayable, the powerful inchoate feelings and affinities and fears which 
dispute with us the control of our lives, as inner. We are creatures with inner depths; with 
partly unexplored and dark interiors.251 
What I hope emerges from Petrarch’s account of Marius is just how strikingly 
unprecedented Petrarch’s conception of personal identity is when framed against the very 
tradition he sought to emulate. For Petrarch, the ancient heroes had power (valuit 
autoritas) precisely because he conferred upon them an inner dimension to which he 
could relate: Marius displayed a “strength of soul,” as Petrarch writes in his letter to 
Giovanni Colonna, whose bravery and steadfastness encouraged other souls to imitate his 
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example. Based on Cicero’s account, however, we have seen that Marius did not have an 
inner dimension of this sort. His ability to withstand the pain of surgery without being 
strapped down was more a function of his social and moral obligations to Roman society 
than it was a function of his “inner strength.” That Petrarch failed to see this intimate 
connection between the individual and society in classical antiquity was certainly a 
product of his own life and times in 14th century Italy; but it is precisely the subjective 
and personal nature of this normative reevaluation of the lives of the ancient heroes that 
marks Petrarch as a forefather of the modern world. As Nicholas Mann, noted British 
cultural historian and scholar of Petrarch, observes: 
 …in his [Petrarch’s] perception of himself, in his acute awareness of his inner motives, 
and in his never-ceasing efforts to construct an image of himself for posterity, we might 
consider him the first modern man. That image must be recaptured from the whole range 
of his writings, but as he recedes into the tree-lined fourteenth-century landscape of 
Simone Martini’s miniature, pen in hand, he lingers in the mind’s eye incarnate in that 
Virgilian vision: as poet, as scholar-exegete, and as his own several heroes.252 
In conclusion, we may say that Petrarch presents to his readers a remarkably 
complex and, at times, contradictory portrait of personal identity. On the one hand, 
Petrarch expounds a conception of the self that is fragmented, divided from itself and 
God, and torn between the forces of passion and the strictures of reason. On the other 
hand, Petrarch also presents the self as the source of all values and objectivity, as the 
autonomous and responsible subject of his life’s decisions and historical comparisons.253 
My aim in this chapter has been to articulate the nature of these contradictions in a way 
that highlights the various inner dimensions that underlie Petrarch’s composite notion of 
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personal identity; for it is precisely “in between” these points of inner tension that 
Petrarch negotiates between his own subjective existence and the moral exigencies of his 
Christian faith.  
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Conclusion: Love, Knowledge and Periagōgē 
 
“Cerco del viver mio novo consiglio, 
 et veggio 'l meglio, et al peggior m'appiglio.”  
 
                       –Petrarch: Canzoniere, Sonnet 264  
 
“I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate…I can will 
what is right, but I cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do. 
Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me.” 
  
                      –Augustine: Confessions; Quoted from Rom. 7:15, 18-20 
 
 
 Having examined the works of Augustine and Petrarch for reflections of their 
views on personal identity, we are now better equipped to see where and how their 
conceptions of the human person diverge.  
As was discussed in chapter two, Augustine’s portrait of personal identity centers 
on the fragility and perversity of the human will. We are proud and lustful creatures, as 
Augustine argues in On Free Choice of the Will, who have “turned away” from the higher 
and more enduring fruits of love, justice and truth in favor of the lower pleasures of the 
body. Our wills are broken and our “loves,” or desires, are disordered. Dissatisfied with 
our earthly condition, we seek to detach ourselves from the changeless order that God has 
created; we seek, in Augustine’s words, to indulge in a perverse form of exaltation 
motivated by pride and willful ignorance. “This then is the original evil,” as Augustine 
laments in City of God: “man regards himself as his own light, and turns away from that 
light which would make man himself a light if he would set his heart on it.”254  
The result of this “original evil” is a corrosion of the human soul. Our “loves” 
fasten upon the things of this world and in so doing we become enthralled with the goods 
                                                 
254 Op. cit. Augustine. City of God, Book XIV Chapter 13, p. 573.  
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of a lower order which, “when compared to the higher one, is death.”255 Recall, by way of 
example, Augustine’s own description of his inner struggle in Book VIII of his 
Confessions:  
…I was held fast, not in fetters clamped upon by another, but by my own will, which had 
the strength of iron chains. The enemy held my will in his power and from it he made a 
chain and shackled me. For my will was perverse and lust had grown from it, and when I 
gave in to lust habit was born, and when I did not resist the habit it became a necessity. 
These were the links which together formed what I have called my chain, and it held me 
fast in the duress of servitude. But the new will which had come to life in me and made 
me wish to serve you freely and enjoy you, my God, who are our only certain joy, was 
not yet strong enough to overcome the old, hardened as it was by the passage of time. So 
these two wills within me, one old, one new, one the servant of the flesh, the other of the 
spirit, were in conflict and between them they tore my soul apart.256  
The perversity of the human will forms an iron chain which links lust to habit, and habit 
to pure necessity. For Augustine, this chain shackles his soul, binding him by necessity to 
the worldly pleasures of the flesh. Indeed, despite knowing with his mind what he ought 
to do, Augustine’s will is so divided that he is utterly incapable of acting upon the 
commands that reason prescribes.  
 Augustine’s own experience of his earthly predicament thus leads him to a 
conception of the human person that ultimately relies upon the grace of God for its 
restoration: we are inherently broken and love imperfectly, and yet somehow we are made 
whole by that which loves us. As Augustine states in a famous passage, “…you [God] 
made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you.”257  
                                                 
255 Op. cit. Augustine. On Free Choice of the Will, Book II Chapter 19, p. 82.  
256 Op. cit. Augustine. Confessions, Book VIII Chapter 5, p. 164.  
257 Ibid. Book I Chapter I, p. 21  
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Petrarch’s conception of personal identity, while retaining Augustine’s 
representation of the will as inherently broken and divided from both itself and God, 
differs in a number of respects from that of St. Augustine. Consider the contrast between 
the following two passages:  
A noble mind (generosus animus) can nowhere rest (acquiescere) except in God, where 
our end lies, or in itself and its secret cares or in some soul joined to it by great 
likeness.258  
You [God] made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you.259 
Whereas Augustine refers the soul to the “invisible things of God,” Petrarch succeeds in 
making his own intensive self the telos of his mind’s journey to find inner peace.260 
Whereas Augustine is always calling us to direct our attention within in order to be drawn 
without toward God, Petrarch’s creative energies are almost uniformly directed to 
dissecting poetically the various inner dimensions that underlie his composite notion of 
self. Recall, for example, Petrarch’s imagined dialogue between Joy and Reason in his De 
remediis utruisque fortune:  
Joy: I am enjoying a passionate love. 
Reason: You will be overpowered by the snares of passion.  
Joy: I am burning with a passionate love.  
Reason: You are right to say burning. For love is a hidden fire, a pleasing wound, a sweet 
bitterness, a delightful disease, an agreeable torture, a charming death [my emphasis].261 
“Love is…a pleasing wound, a sweet bitterness, a delightful disease…” Despite the 
frustration and pain that marks Petrarch’s “passionate love” for Laura, one could also 
                                                 
258 Francesco Petrarch. De vita solitaria, I, Prose 296. Quoted in: Op. cit. F.E. Cranz. The Reorientation of 
Western Thought c. 1100 A.D., p. 13.  
259 Op. cit. Augustine. Confessions, Book I Chapter I, p. 21.  
260 Op. cit. F.E. Cranz. The Reorientation of Western Thought c. 1100 A.D., p. 13.  
261 Op. cit. Francesco Petrarch. De remediis utriusque fortune, I 69. Quoted in: Nicholas Mann. Petrarch. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 77. 
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argue that he derives pleasure from describing poetically this suffering. That is to say, 
Petrarch’s “love” of Laura is also a form of narcissism whereby he dissects poetically his 
experience of the love and discovers, in the process, his own self-identity.  
 Petrarch’s conception of personal identity is thus ultimately intensive in its 
orientation, as that which turns inward in order to “create” or “invent” a poetic 
individuality. In contrast to Augustine, this process of self-analysis does not lead Petrarch 
to God, nor does it lead him to a conjunctive vision of intelligible beings; instead, 
Petrarch’s creative and emotional energies were spent trying to understand the 
significance of his life here, in the “stadium” of this world. As Petrarch writes in a letter 
of 1339:   
For it is in this stadium that our life’s race is run; the end is where the exertion comes to 
rest. And we are not alone in this opinion; for what else does Cicero mean when he says 
that this life is a journey towards heaven? Nevertheless, this mortal life has, now and 
then, something similar to the eternal life, so that if it is not yet happy—for happiness is 
only that to which nothing can be added—this mortal life can still look down on human 
miseries far below it, and, standing below, it can still shine with the light from above.262   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
262 Op. cit. Francesco Petrarch. Epistulae familiares, IV 2, 5-6. Quoted in: Robert E. Proctor. Defining the 
Humanities, p. 38.  
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